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FROM SOCRATES TO SELFIES: LEGAL EDUCATION 
AND THE METACOGNITIVE REVOLUTION 
Jaime Alison Lee* 
ABSTRACT 
Metacognitive thinking, a methodology for mastering intellectually 
challenging material, is revolutionizing legal education. Metacogni-
tion empowers people to increase their mental capabilities by discov-
ering and correcting flaws in their thinking processes. For decades, 
legal educators have employed metacognitive strategies in specialized 
areas of the curriculum. Today, metacognition has the potential to 
transform legal education curriculum-wide. 
Current scholarship is rich, generous, and creative in exploring how 
metacognition can be used to enrich specific sectors of the law curric-
ulum. What is missing, however, is a holistic examination of how met-
acognitive theory and practice have developed across these different 
sectors, with the purpose of improving the theoretical framework and 
increasing its effectiveness. This Article comprehensively reviews the 
many facets of the metacognitive revolution, drawing parallels for the 
first time between experiential and non-experiential pedagogies and 
further relating them to recent accreditation mandates. It then ad-
dresses the likelihood that an important phase of the metacognitive 
revolution—the mandate to implement formative assessments with 
meaningful feedback—might be widely but poorly implemented, and 
thus cause more harm than benefit. To mitigate this problem, the Ar-
ticle suggests two new ways of conceptualizing what constitutes 
“meaningful feedback.” The first is that for feedback to be meaningful, 
it must be accompanied by metacognitive reflection. The second is that 
feedback takes on meaning when prefaced by the deconstruction and 
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abstraction, or “naming,” of legal thinking processes. Both insights 
emerge only upon a holistic examination of metacognitive theory and 
practice as they have developed across disparate sectors of the legal 
curriculum.   
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INTRODUCTION 
A revolution is afoot in legal education that is both momen-
tous and misunderstood. Metacognitive thinking, an intellec-
tual strategy for mastering complex material that focuses on 
planning, performance, self-reflection, and self-correction, is 
dramatically reshaping the law curriculum. Metacognitive the-
ory is supported by decades of research1 and holds great prom-
ise to improve core legal competencies and to enhance good 
judgment, intelligence, lifelong learning skills, and mental 
health.2 Metacognitive techniques have long been employed in 
pedagogies focused on legal writing, experiential learning, 
some first-year courses, and other curricular specialties, and 
their growing influence is demonstrated by the recent accredi-
tation mandate to use formative assessments (that is, mid-
course evaluation tools) throughout the curriculum.3 This man-
date has the potential to broadly transform legal education. 
However, the theoretical framework for metacognition in legal 
education is incompletely developed, which may cause this 
phase of the metacognitive revolution to ultimately fail in its 
goals. To address this vulnerability, this article undertakes a ho-
listic examination of metacognitive theory and practice across 
different sectors of the law curriculum, with the aim of discov-
ering guiding principles for the effective use of metacognition 
in legal education. The article highlights a number of these 
guiding principles, including two new approaches to the form-
ative assessment mandate.4  
Metacognitive theory holds that human performance im-
proves when people strategically plan and reflect on past 
 
1. See, e.g., Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to Be Self- Regulated Learners, 
2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 447 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz I] (detailing extensive studies in 
the effectiveness of self-learning curriculums for law school instruction); see also Cheryl B. Pres-
ton et al., Teaching “Thinking Like a Lawyer”: Metacognition and Law Students, 2014 BYU L. REV. 
1053, 1062 (2015); Anthony Niedwiecki, Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the Metacogni-
tive Skills of Law Students Through More Effective Formative Assessment Techniques, 40 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 149, 150 (2012) [hereinafter Niedwiecki I]. 
2. See infra Part II. 
3. See infra Section I.D.2. 
4. See infra Part III. 
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experiences in order to improve future performance.5 The fun-
damental idea is that people learn, think, and perform more ef-
fectively when they deliberately map out their intellectual 
choices, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their thinking 
processes, and purposefully adjust those thought patterns in 
ways intended to improve their outcomes.6 The metacognitive 
thinker masters material more deeply and more efficiently, de-
velops a lifelong ability to conquer new problems, improves her 
judgment, and even increases her intelligence.7 In short, if a 
metaphorical road represented a person’s learning trajectory, 
with a starting line marked “novice” and a finish line marked 
“mastery,” the metacognitive approach shortens the length of 
that road.8 
The metacognitive approach holds great promise to enhance 
every person’s intellectual capacity, regardless of her prior aca-
demic credentials or skill levels. Metacognition can enhance any 
type of legal expertise, whether the goal is to understand the 
Erie doctrine or the business judgment rule; conquer the tradi-
tional issue-spotting exam; craft an opening statement for a 
jury; or explore how the law interacts with other societal forces. 
Metacognitive theory has been used in a growing number of 
contexts within the legal academy, including traditional doctri-
nal courses,9 a first-year class devoted to legal reasoning and 
self-regulated learning,10 legal research and writing courses,11 
 
5. See infra Section I.A. 
6. See infra Section II.A. 
7. See infra Section II.A. 
8. Barbara Lentz, Incorporating Reflection into Law Teaching and Learning, in EXPERIENTIAL 
EDUCATION IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM 17, 18–21 (Emily Grant, Sandra Simpson & Kelly 
Terry eds., 2018); see also, e.g., E. Scott Fruehwald, How to Help Students from Disadvantaged Back-
grounds Succeed in Law School, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 83, 107 (2013) (explaining that students who 
are not taught metacognitive thinking skills are less efficient learners than students who have 
those skills). 
9. See, e.g., Carol Springer Sargent & Andrea A. Curcio, Empirical Evidence That Formative 
Assessments Improve Final Exams, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379, 384 (2012). 
10. See Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 484. 
11. See, e.g., Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to Legal 
Education, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 54 (2006) [hereinafter Niedwiecki II]; Nancy Millich, Building 
Blocks of Analysis: Using Simple “Sesame Street Skills” and Sophisticated Educational Learning 
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experiential classes,12 legal ethics,13 academic support,14 profes-
sional and moral identity development,15 and in the context of 
teaching methods focused specifically on millennials,16 the 
problem method,17 and students from disadvantaged back-
grounds.18 Metacognition’s influence is so broad that many of 
its principles are now embedded into the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA)’s accreditation standards.19  
What makes the metacognitive approach “revolutionary”? 
Understanding its significance requires a brief look at what the 
revolution is upending. For nearly 150 years, the primary meth-
odology for legal education has been the Langdellian case 
 
Theories in Teaching a Seminar in Legal Analysis and Writing, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1128 
(1994); Kristina L. Niedringhaus, Teaching Better Research Skills by Teaching Metacognitive Ability, 
18 PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 113, 113 (2010). 
12. See infra Section I.E. This article employs the terms “experiential” and “non-experiential” 
merely for convenience, with the former referring to clinical, externship, and simulation 
courses. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS 2018–2019 § 304(a) (2018) [hereinafter 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS]. For an analysis of 
the intellectual incoherence of such labels “doctrine” vs. “skills” courses and their harmful ef-
fects, see Linda H. Edwards, The Trouble with Categories: What Theory Can Teach Us About the 
Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 181, 210–27 (2014); see also Margaret Martin Barry, Jon 
C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 1, 27–30 (2000) (discussing how the divide between “experiential” and other courses often 
determines faculty status and compensation, which in turn affects how academic institutions 
are governed).  
13. See, e.g., Filippa M. Anzalone, Education for the Law: Reflective Education for the Law, in 
HANDBOOK OF REFLECTION AND REFLECTIVE INQUIRY: MAPPING A WAY OF KNOWING FOR 
PROFESSIONAL REFLECTIVE INQUIRY 85, 93 n.53 (Nona Lyons ed., 2000). 
14. See, e.g., Louis N. Schulze, Jr., Using Science to Build Better Learners: One School’s Successful 
Efforts to Raise Its Bar Passage Rates in an Era of Decline, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. 230, 231–32 (2019). 
15. See, e.g., E. Scott Fruehwald, Developing Law Students’ Professional Identities, 37 U. LA 
VERNE L. REV. 1, 5 (2015); Christine Cerniglia Brown, Professional Identity Formation: Working 
Backwards to Move the Profession Forward, 61 LOY. L. REV. 313, 317 (2015); Timothy Casey, Reflec-
tive Practice in Legal Education: The Stages of Reflection, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 317, 348–50 (2014). 
16. See, e.g., Renee Nicole Allen & Alicia R. Jackson, Contemporary Teaching Strategies: Effec-
tively Engaging Millennials Across the Curriculum, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2017); Ruth 
Vance & Susan Stuart, Of Moby Dick & Tartar Sauce: The Academically Underprepared Law Student 
& the Curse of Overconfidence, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 133, 148–61 (2015); Shailini Jandial George, Teach-
ing the Smartphone Generation: How Cognitive Science Can Improve Learning in Law School, 66 ME. 
L. REV. 163, 180–82 (2013); Jason S. Palmer, ”The Millennials Are Coming!”: Improving Self-Efficacy 
in Law Students Through Universal Design in Learning, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 675, 696–99 (2015). 
17. See Shirley Lung, The Problem Method: No Simple Solution, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 
758–59 (2009). 
18. See Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 114–15. 
19. See infra Section II.D. 
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method, which dissects judicial opinions in order to deduct uni-
versal legal principles,20 coupled with Socratic questioning tech-
niques. Critics of these traditional methods argue that they not 
only teach the wrong material,21 but also that they teach it 
poorly.22 Professor Michael Hunter Schwartz critiques the So-
cratic method as expecting students to “self-teach”23 and to 
learn “vicariously,”24 in that  
law professors structure classroom interactions as 
one-on-one, professor-on-student dialogues. Pro-
fessors expect that the other students in the clas-
ses will learn by watching these interactions . . . . 
Vicarious instruction assumes some sort of re-
bound learning effect; somehow the professor’s 
comments, questions, and corrections of the se-
lected student not only will help the selected stu-
dent, but will rub off on all the students in the 
class. This method also presupposes that the non-
 
20. See, e.g., Robert Rubinson, The Holmes School of Law: A Proposal to Reform Legal Education 
Through Realism, 35 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 33, 48 (2015).  
21. For instance, a primary critique of the Langdellian method argues it fails to teach prac-
tical skills as well as “ways of thinking within and about the role of lawyers—methods of critical 
analysis, planning, and decision-making,” and thus inadequately prepares students for the 
practice of law. See Barry et al., supra note 12, at 34. 
22. See e.g., Sheila I. Vélez Martínez, Towards an Outcrit Pedagogy of Anti-Subordination in the 
Classroom, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 593 (“A long line of articles and reports by scholars, foun-
dations, and ABA special committees has consistently highlighted the need for pedagogical di-
versification in law school.”); see also Rubinson, supra note 20, at 49. 
23. Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory & Instructional 
Design Can Inform & Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 350 (2001) [hereinafter 
Schwartz II]. 
24. Id. at 351. For a similar critique of the Socratic method as “implicit teaching,” see Nied-
wiecki II, supra note 11, at 33–34 (“Most professors probably believe that [Socratic] instruction 
helps students to ‘think like a lawyer,’ with the goal being that the students will eventually ask 
themselves similar questions when they analyze cases on their own . . . . [In reality, t]his often 
prevents a student from being able to fully transfer the in-class experience to new situations 
[because] the purpose of the questioning is never explicitly explained to the students, and there 
is generally no questioning that delves into the explicit thought processes of the students.” (em-
phasis added)). See also Martínez, supra note 22, at 591 (noting that the Socratic method, as im-
plemented by many law faculty, omits the important act of engaging students in knowledge 
production); Lentz, supra note 8, at 27 (explaining that as implemented, Socratic dialogue is 
merely questions, but without reflection or learning). For a defense of traditional law teaching 
methods, see Gary Shaw, A Heretical View of Teaching: A Contrarian Looks at Teaching, the Carnegie 
Report, & Best Practices, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1239 (2012). 
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selected students know to play along, answering 
the queries in their heads and learning to think 
like lawyers by experiencing vicariously what the 
speaking student actually experiences.25 
Schwartz likens this traditional law classroom experience to 
trying to learn how to swim by watching other people jump in 
a pool one-by-one and try to swim with no prior training.26 He 
contrasts this method with proper swim lessons that provide 
explicit instruction on successful kicking and breathing tech-
niques and offer every student ample personal time in the pool 
to practice, get feedback, and work on improving their skills.27 
Schwartz’s analogy demonstrates why frequently-recom-
mended reforms for legal education include clearer instruction, 
more opportunities for evaluation and feedback, and more en-
gaged learning methodologies, through which students do not 
seek to learn passively but instead actively participate in gener-
ating their own knowledge.28 All of these reforms are part of the 
metacognitive approach. 
Critics of traditional law teaching methods also point out that 
those methods have never been proven effective,29 unlike the 
metacognitive approach, which is backed by decades of re-
search. Professor Schwartz notes that hundreds of studies link 
 
25. See Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 351. 
26. Id. at 354–55. 
27. Id. at 356. 
28. See id. at 376, 380. For discussions of passive learning, see Elizabeth M. Bloom, A Law 
School Game Changer: (Trans)formative Feedback, 41 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227, 236–37 (2015) (discuss-
ing the passive role that students play by merely receiving feedback rather than taking a par-
ticipatory role in the feedback process) [hereinafter Bloom I]; Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Train-
ing, Revisited: The Clinical Education Spiral, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 494–95 (2013) (discussing the 
passive “‘banking concept of education’ where students are seen as empty vessels into which 
teachers pour their knowledge” (quoting William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for 
the New Clinical Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 474 (1995))). 
29. See, e.g., Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones & Tanya M. Washington, Does Practice 
Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam Performance, 
35 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 271, 272–74 (2008) (discussing the lack of empirical evidence behind tradi-
tional legal pedagogy); Martínez, supra note 22, at 595 (arguing that the effectiveness of the case-
dialogue method has “never been demonstrated”).  
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aspects of metacognition to better educational outcomes,30 and 
he and other scholars have also connected it to other learning 
theories, including cognitivism (focusing on how the brain pro-
cesses and stores learning)31, constructivism (emphasizing the 
learner’s personal experience and the active construction and 
negotiation of meaning),32 social cognitivism (exploring the re-
lationship of learning and social interactions),33 experiential 
learning theory,34 transfer theory, 35 and andragogical theory (fo-
cusing specifically on how adults learn).36  
Educational experts in other disciplines have long embraced 
metacognition37 and there is good reason that legal experts are 
now exploring it. The metacognitive approach trains thinkers to 
not only more deeply and efficiently master core legal skills, but 
it also especially succeeds in developing the ability to transfer 
learning from one context to another.38 This is especially useful 
for legal thinking, which requires that abstract, complex con-
cepts be transferred to an endless variety of new contexts in 
ways that are highly flexible and creative, yet also retain 
 
30. For an extensive review of the literature, see Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 472–86. See also 
Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1062 (noting that metacognition is regularly covered in general 
education and educational psychology textbooks, handbooks, and journals and “has become an 
extremely important concept in education scholarship”); Margaret Y. K. Woo & Jeremy R. 
Paul, From the Editors, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 705, 705–06 (2016) (introducing the 2016 volume of the 
Journal of Legal Education dedicated almost exclusively to the topic of metacognition). 
31. E.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 371–72; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 454. 
32. E.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 380; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 454. 
33. E.g., Elizabeth M. Bloom, Teaching Law Students to Teach Themselves: Using Lessons from 
Educational Psychology to Shape Self-Regulated Learners, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 311, 316 (2013) [herein-
after Bloom II]. 
34. See Lentz, supra note 8, at 28; see also infra Section I.E. 
35. See, e.g., Tonya Kowalski, True North: Navigating for the Transfer of Learning in Legal Edu-
cation, 34 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 51, 52–53 (2010). 
36. See, e.g., Frank Bloch, The Andragogical Basis for Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 
321, 327 (1982) (citing psychologist Malcolm Knowles); Casey, supra note 15, at 328–31 (discuss-
ing other learning theories used to explain behavior observed in the clinical classroom that was 
not addressed by Bloch’s thesis); Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 47. 
37. See, e.g., Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 35 (Metacognition is “widely accepted and uni-
versally applied in many educational environments.”); see also Preston et al., supra note 1, at 
1062. The classic learning taxonomy produced by Benjamin Bloom, commonly referred to as 
“Bloom’s Taxonomy,” was revised in 2001 to include metacognition. Allen & Jackson, supra note 
16, at 25.  
38. See infra Section II.A.3. 
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analytical integrity.39 Metacognition training holds significant 
promise to foster greater excellence in legal thought, increase 
bar passage rates, heighten satisfaction among clients and em-
ployers, as well as to increase personal motivation, engage-
ment, and mental health among law students and practition-
ers.40 
For all of these reasons, the metacognition revolution is 
changing what law schools teach and how they teach it. Recent 
scholarship is brimming with creative, well-designed proposals 
that are carefully grounded in both learning theory and experi-
ence and that generously share insight into how metacognition 
can be applied to legal studies.41 Much work remains to be done, 
however, to fully understand how metacognition is best ap-
plied in the context of legal thinking.  
What is missing from the current body of literature is a holis-
tic analysis of metacognitive theory and practice across differ-
ent sectors of the law curriculum, with the purpose of revealing 
points of weakness and ways to correct them. This Article un-
dertakes this project. The next two parts of this Article explain 
the metacognitive approach, demonstrate how broadly and 
deeply it is embedded into the legal curriculum, and discuss its 
importance. Part I details the steps in metacognitive thinking 
and illustrates how this approach has been used in courses for 
first-year students, legal writing, and experiential education, 
among others, and explains how industry-wide reform efforts 
also embrace elements of the metacognitive approach. Part II 
then explains how the metacognitive approach benefits legal 
education, drawing on learning and educational psychology 
theory to explain its power to improve the quality of legal think-
ing and the mental health of law students and lawyers.  
Part III examines how the spreading influence of metacogni-
tion also carries risks, and how these risks can be addressed. In 
 
39. See infra Section II.A.3. 
40. See infra Section II.B. 
41. See, e.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 383–84. Literature cited throughout this article con-
tains many concrete examples of metacognitive techniques.  
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particular, the ABA now requires law schools to incorporate a 
fundamental component of the metacognitive approach, form-
ative assessment with meaningful feedback, throughout the en-
tire curriculum.42 This presents an opportunity for broad curric-
ular transformation based on metacognitive principles. An 
inadequate understanding of what constitutes “meaningful 
feedback,” however, may severely undermine the effectiveness 
of the ABA mandate.  
Current literature seeks to cure this limitation primarily by 
improving the type and form of feedback provided, particularly 
with respect to the use of “model” answers in connection with 
traditional midterm issue-spotting exams.43 This is an appropri-
ate and necessary response. This article proposes, however, two 
new ways to conceptualize what meaningful feedback is. First, 
it argues that improved feedback techniques must be more de-
liberately selected with metacognitive purposes in mind, and 
that second, that better feedback must also be accompanied by 
another metacognitive strategy: the deconstruction and abstrac-
tion, or “naming,” of legal thinking processes. These two pro-
posals are intended to prevent weak implementation of the 
meaningful-feedback mandate and to maximize the benefits of 
the metacognitive revolution. 
I. THE METACOGNITIVE REVOLUTION AND ITS COMPONENTS 
This section explains the metacognitive approach and pro-
vides concrete examples of how it is currently implemented in 
the law school curriculum. It further discusses how metacogni-
tive principles were embraced by influential curricular reform 
proposals published decades ago, and how these principles to-
day are reflected in accreditation standards set by the ABA. This 
discussion highlights core principles reflected in the many dif-
ferent components of the metacognitive revolution, including 
courses focused on first-year students, experiential learning, 
 
42. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, § 303(a)(3). 
43. See, e.g., Bloom I, supra note 28, at 242. 
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and legal writing. In addition, since this is one of very few arti-
cles to meaningfully incorporate clinical theory and practice 
into discussions about metacognition, this section closes with a 
brief review of the close alignment between clinical theory and 
metacognitive theory. 
A. The Metacognitive Approach 
Broadly speaking, “[c]ognition is the way in which we think 
about, approach, obtain, and process information. Metacogni-
tion is the study of how we cognate.”44 Metacognition requires 
a person to closely examine how she personally approaches an 
intellectually challenging situation, and to strategically alter her 
thinking patterns and behavior in order to increase their effec-
tiveness.45 A person with strong metacognitive skills actively 
defines her intellectual goal; plans out strategies for achieving 
the goal; attempts to implement those strategies; monitors 
whether her attempt was successful or not; identifies flaws in 
her thinking and behavior that hampered her success; and ad-
justs her thought processes and actions in order to improve her 
outcome next time.46 In sum, metacognition “refers to the pro-
cesses used to plan, monitor, and assess one’s understanding 
and performance,”47 and to consciously alter one’s thinking and 
behavior, to better succeed at the task at hand. 
How does a metacognitive thinker gain such an acute level of 
self-awareness and successfully channel it into intellectual self-
improvement? A review of the literature focused on the context 
of legal education reveals a twelve-step process that this article 
refers to as “the metacognitive approach.”48 When faced with an 
 
44. Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory 
of the Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 315, 324 (1997).  
45. Allen & Jackson, supra note 16, at 14. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. The term “metacognition” has been defined in many ways, and its meaning continues 
to evolve. E.g., Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques & Metacognition in Law 
School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 8 (2003); Patti Alleva 
& Jennifer A. Gundlach, Learning Intentionally and the Metacognitive Task, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 710, 
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intellectual task—such as reading or briefing a case, taking a 
midterm, writing a motion, or meeting with a client49—a strong 
metacognitive thinker does the following:  
1. Identifies the goals or desired outcomes of the up-
coming activity;50  
2. Identifies what resources she already possesses 
that may help her achieve those goals, along with 
when and how to use these resources. Resources 
can include prior personal knowledge and expe-
riences, intellectual and emotional skills,51 and 
techniques for achieving personal productivity;52  
3. Identifies additional resources that may help her 
achieve the goals, but that she does not yet pos-
sess; and identifies how to access those resources, 
and when and how to use them;  
 
714 n.14, 722 (2016); Niedwiecki I, supra note 1, at 155. The twelve steps of the metacognitive 
approach, as outlined above, are extrapolated from various sources that define the subsets of 
the metacognitive or self-regulated learning processes. The twelve-step process articulated 
above organizes these many components into a single list. See, e.g., DENISE RIEBE & MICHAEL 
HUNTER SCHWARTZ, PASS THE BAR!, 78–80 (2006); Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 452; Casey, supra 
note 15, at 322; Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1058; Bloom II, supra note 33, at 313, 316–17; Nied-
wiecki II, supra note 11, 41–44. 
49. While the performance of legal skills or tasks is viewed by some as only occurring in 
experiential or legal research and writing experiences, the metacognitive approach views any 
performance of a component of legal analysis as an experience from which one can learn. This 
includes the performance of tasks during, or in preparation for, a non-experiential course, such 
as pre-class reading, case briefing, participating in class dialogue, studying for quizzes or ex-
ams, taking an exam, etc. See, e.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23 (applying the metacognitive ap-
proach to many facets of law school performance to teach students how to become self-regu-
lated learners). 
50. See Schwartz I supra note 1, at 453. 
51. Examples of emotional skills include the ability to stay motivated, and the ability to com-
bat feelings that may hinder progress toward the goal, such as frustration, anxiety, or boredom. 
See Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 456, 459. “[L]earning involves not only cognition and metacog-
nition, but an affective aspect as well. Deep thinking about one’s own thinking necessarily im-
plicates awareness and monitoring of thoughts and emotions. Correspondingly, teaching that 
does not engage the affective ‘may result in relatively incomplete, temporary, and unsophisti-
cated learning.’” Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 724 (footnote omitted). 
52. Productivity techniques may include strategies for, inter alia, focusing one’s attention 
deeply on the task at hand, minimizing distractions, and allocating one’s time effectively among 
different tasks. See, e.g., Bloom II, supra note 33, at 330; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 458–59.  
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4. Identifies personal weaknesses or barriers that 
may hinder progress toward the goals;  
5. Identifies an array of possible strategies that she 
could use to achieve the goals; 
6. Selects the specific strategies that she believes will 
be most effective and efficient;  
7. Performs the task, using the selected strategies; 
8. Collects information that may indicate whether 
the performance was successful or not, including 
information generated by external sources (e.g., a 
test grade or a judge’s ruling) as well as infor-
mation generated by the actor herself; 
9. Identifies the specific characteristics of a perfor-
mance that achieves the goals identified in step 1, 
as well as the specific characteristics of a perfor-
mance that fails in those goals; 
10. Evaluates specific ways in which her own perfor-
mance either met or failed to meet the goals; 
11. Identifies what contributed to both the successful 
and unsuccessful aspects of her performance; and 
12. Identifies how she should adjust or adapt her 
thinking and behavior in order to improve her 
performance in the future.  
Once the metacognitive thinker reaches step 12, she starts the 
cycle anew at step 1, redefining her learning goals based on 
what she has just experienced. As she proceeds once again 
through the entire cycle, she applies what she learned from her 
prior experience to further modify her thinking and actions. The 
more often that the cycle is repeated, the more opportunities she 
has to refine her approach and to achieve greater success. The  
actual performance of the task at hand serves as the central cat-
alyst for learning, and careful attention to her own thought 
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processes and behaviors empowers her to self-improve. In sum, 
a strong metacognitive thinker carefully plans out, evaluates, 
and modifies her thinking processes and behaviors, with the ex-
plicit purpose of improving her outcomes. 
The metacognitive approach may seem to some like a com-
mon sense or “natural” learning process, but it is in fact highly 
counterintuitive and unnatural for most, since it asks people to 
question their instinctual thinking patterns and behaviors, and 
to affirmatively replace their default patterns with different 
ones. Thus, “‘[m]etacognition is not an automatic process,’ but 
is rather, the result of an active and constant manipulation of 
one’s cognitive process.”53 Consequently, the metacognitive ap-
proach is not innate or easily adopted, but must be explicitly 
taught,54 consciously engaged in, and repeatedly practiced in 
order to be successful.55  
Accordingly, law students need careful, step-by-step training 
to build and develop their metacognitive skills over time.56 The 
twelve steps will eventually become more automatic and seam-
less (for example, a very experienced trial lawyer can absorb 
feedback from a witness, judge, and jury simultaneously, and 
accordingly can alter her cross-examination strategies mid-
 
53. Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 42 (quoting Rebecca Jacobson, Teachers Improving Learning 
Using Metacognition with Self-monitoring Learning, 111 EDUC. 579, 581 (1998)). 
54. See, e.g., Bloom II, supra note 33, at 329 (“I work to provide my students with ‘pedagogi-
cal context’ by being “explicit and transparent about teaching metacognition.” (internal cita-
tions omitted)); Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 109. 
55. “[S]uccessfully training students to be metacognitive thinkers requires time and repeti-
tion.” Adam Lamparello, The Integrated Law School Curriculum, 8 ELON L. REV. 407, 434 (2016) 
(discussing a writing program that runs over the course of six semesters). 
56. See, e.g., Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1062–73 (discussing a study demonstrating that 
entering law students have poor metacognitive skills); Casey, supra note 15, at 350–51 (“[T]hink-
ing in action is particularly difficult for [student] practitioners because they do not have expe-
rience to guide them in deciding what to consider,” such that teaching the reflective process 
through post-hoc examination, which “decoupl[es] . . . thought and action,” is critical “to develop 
the capacity of the new lawyer to think in action” and to “instill a default preference for reflec-
tion.”). “Millennials” may be particularly in need of formal training in order to engage in self-
reflection. See e.g., Alistair E. Newbern & Emily F. Suski, Translating the Values of Clinical Peda-
gogy Across Generations, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 181 (2013); Emily A. Benfer & Colleen F. Shanahan, 
Educating the Invincibles: Strategies for Teaching the Millennial Generation in Law School, 20 
CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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stream or “in real time”57). However, such metacognitive mas-
tery usually only comes after many years of professional prac-
tice. For law students lacking those years of experience, meta-
cognitive skills must be taught explicitly and practiced 
repeatedly. The following section discusses commonalities in 
how these skills are taught by metacognitive experts in various 
areas of the curriculum. 
B. The Recursive Cycle 
The most well-developed models for teaching metacognition 
in law school break it down into a clearly articulated, three-
phase cycle that occurs recursively over a period of study. Two 
very similar models are discussed below, one that is designed 
for first-year students and refers to the three-phase cycle of 
“forethought, performance, and reflection.”58 The other model 
has been widely taught for decades in experiential courses and 
refers to a similar cycle of “plan, do, and reflect.”59  
 
57. See Casey, supra note 15, at 350–51 (“The truly reflective practitioner engages in contem-
poraneous thinking in action…[she] has the capacity to analyze the context and adapt the per-
formance while the decision is still under consideration.”). 
58. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 454 (emphasis omitted). 
59. See generally Kimberly O’Leary, Evaluating Clinical Law Teaching-Suggestions for Law Pro-
fessors Who Have Never Used the Clinical Teaching Method, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 491, 510 (2002) (“Many 
clinical professors find the heart of the course is in teaching students how to engage in the three-
part process for their professional lives (developing action plans, executing those plans, reflect-
ing on those plans).”); William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical 
Law Professor: A View from the First Floor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 477 (1995); Meredith Heagney, 
Plan, Do, Reflect: Clinical Teaching at the Law School, U. OF CHIC. L. SCH. (Apr., 22, 2013), 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/plan-do-reflect-clinical-teaching-law-school. Externship 
pedagogy has similarly long emphasized a cycle of “Plan, Do, Reflect, Integrate,” as memorial-
ized in a leading textbook for externship courses, Learning from Practice, the second edition of 
which states as “its central theme [] teaching students how to learn from experience, how to 
become reflective practitioners.” As the authors say, the text is infused with the “mantra-like 
method for reflective lawyering: Plan, Do, Reflect, Integrate.” Erica M. Eisinger, The Externship 
Class Requirement: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 659, 672 (2004); see also J.P. 
OGILVY, LEAH WORTHAM, & LISA G. LERMAN, LEARNING FROM PRACTICE, 3 (“to maximize learn-
ing from experience, need to plan for the experience, have the experience, reflect on what hap-
pened, and integrate or synthesize what is been learned with existing knowledge and other 
sources of learning.”) [hereinafter LEARNING FROM PRACTICE]. For a four-stage variation on this 
cycle, see, e.g., Nancy M. Maurer & Liz Ryan Cole, Design, Teach, and Manage: Ensuring Educa-
tional Integrity in Field Placement Courses, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 115, 145–46 (2012). 
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Professor Michael Hunter Schwartz developed a ground-
breaking two-week course for first-year students60 that teaches 
a variety of skills that law students must master, such as identi-
fying case holdings, understanding how lawyers “stretch” and 
“squeeze” precedent, and breaking down rules into subparts.61 
The course also explicitly teaches the benefits of the metacogni-
tive approach, its step-by-step process, and how to engage in 
each step, with the goal of training students to become “self-
regulated learners.”62 As students grapple with specific legal 
analysis skills, they are simultaneously guided through exer-
cises that expose them to metacognitive techniques and 
strengthen their skills.63 Tools of instruction include faculty 
modeling of the skills to be learned, practice questions and ex-
ams with feedback, as well as reflection, journaling, cooperative 
learning groups, attention to adaptive (regulating) behaviors, 
and attention to affective concerns that can hinder learning such 
as motivational factors and stress management.64  
These exercises help students to plot out their learning strat-
egies, aid them in evaluating whether they are properly learn-
ing the material, and encourage them to design and implement 
strategies for improvement.65 The course takes place just before 
the traditional first-year curriculum begins, so students can ap-
ply these methods throughout their first-year doctrinal courses 
and beyond. Professor Schwartz also directed a task force fo-
cused on re-designing the traditional first-year curriculum to 
actively further the self-regulated learning process, with the 
goal of creating an integrated curriculum.66  
 
60. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 484. The course was first piloted in Fall of 2002 at Western 
State. Id. at 451. 
61. MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, EXPERT LEARNING FOR LAW STUDENTS passim (2d ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ III]. 
62. See id. at 4–5. 
63. See Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 495–97.  
64. See id. at 495–97 (discussing techniques and rationale for teaching the metacognitive ap-
proach); SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61. 
65. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 499–501. 
66. Id. 
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Professor Schwartz’s model presents the metacognitive ap-
proach as a 3-phased cycle of “forethought, performance, and 
reflection,” which mimics the “basic, recurring, overarching in-
structional approach typical of successful self-regulated learn-
ing programs.”67 In the “forethought” phase, a student explores 
and prepares for the activity (steps 1-6 in the metacognitive ap-
proach as described above).68 The student then performs the ac-
tivity (step 7, above), such as briefing a case in preparation for 
class, taking a practice test, or drafting a written assignment.69 
Finally, the student reflects on and evaluates her performance 
(steps 8 through 11, above), both looking backward to examine 
what she did and whether she was successful or not, and look-
ing forward to identify how she will fix flaws in her thinking 
and actions next time.70 Then, the forethought-performance-re-
flection cycle begins again as she prepares for the next round of 
activity, applying the lessons culled from the prior experience 
to try to improve her outcomes. 
Another curricular area that frequently refers to a three-phase 
process is experiential learning.71 The “forethought, perfor-
mance, and reflection” phases are more commonly referred to 
by experiential experts as “plan, do, reflect,” but the phases are 
conceptually identical: first, students prepare for the task at 
hand, then they engage in the task, and finally they seek to un-
derstand their actions and the results, and to identify and im-
plement ways to improve.72 
The three-phase cycle works in an experiential course simi-
larly to how it works in a nonclinical course. The main differ-
ence is that in a nonexperiential course, the cycle generally cen-
ters around the performance of a classroom task such as 
briefing a case or taking a midterm exam,73 while in clinical 
 
67. Id. at 491, 454–55. 
68. See id. at 455–58. 
69. See id. at 458–60. 
70. See id. at 460–61. 
71. See supra note 59. 
72. See supra note 59. 
73. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 32. 
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settings the cycle centers around the performance of a lawyer-
ing activity, such as a client interview.74 The initial planning 
phase for a client interview usually involves readings and sem-
inar discussion exploring theoretical frameworks for interview-
ing along with concrete interviewing techniques.75 These help 
students articulate their goals for the task: what do they hope to 
accomplish during the client interview? Why? How? Such ques-
tions aid in the first of the twelve steps, which is goal setting.76 
The planning stage continues as students assess available re-
sources, such as the client file and doctrinal knowledge learned 
in prior courses; determine if additional resources or research is 
necessary; and then use these resources to prepare a written in-
terview strategy, including drafting specific questions they will 
ask the client. These activities correspond to the planning and 
task-performance steps of the process.77 
Students then receive feedback on their research and inter-
view plans and revise as necessary. This phase corresponds to 
the reflection stage,78 with the cycle starting over again as the 
students re-consider their interview strategy, conduct addi-
tional legal and factual research, and revise their questions. 
They might also perform a mock interview, gain more feedback, 
and reflect on the experience, then once again revise their plans, 
completing yet another “plan, do, reflect” mini-cycle. 
Once students are adequately prepared, they interview the 
actual client and afterward are guided through another post-
performance reflection, during which they use their own self-
assessment, any feedback from the client, and input from peers 
and faculty to evaluate how their performance succeeded or 
failed and why. The results of these reflections then help pre-
pare them for their next performance, which may be a follow-
up interview with the same client or a meeting with a new cli-
ent, renewing the cycle once more and enabling students to 
 
74. See, e.g., O’Leary, supra note 59, at 496. 
75. See, e.g., id. at 496–97. 
76. See Grose, supra note 28, at 497. 
77. See supra Section I.A (discussing steps 2–7 of the metacognitive process). 
78. See supra Section I.A (discussing steps 8–12 of the metacognitive process).  
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transfer lessons learned to a different context. Clinical educa-
tors employ the plan-do-reflect cycle in this way—repeatedly 
and extensively—for all types of lawyering activities, including 
legal research, legal writing of all forms, trials and hearing, ne-
gotiations, and so forth.79 
C. Reflective Questioning 
How are students taught to engage in the metacognitive ap-
proach? Whatever the underlying content being taught , the 
most prevalent technique for engaging students in metacogni-
tion is to ask carefully crafted reflective questions.80 Faculty use 
reflective questioning to deliberately guide students to key is-
sues that need attention—whether they are doctrinal issues, an-
alytical thinking processes, or any other content that must be 
learned—while encouraging students to identify their own 
strengths and weaknesses and strategies for improvement, 
which is one of the hallmarks of metacognitive approach, as dis-
cussed further in Part II. 
The simplest example of reflective questioning might merely 
focus student attention on the key steps of goal setting and self-
improvement. Questions might include: “what do you hope to 
learn from the upcoming experience? What did you in fact learn 
from this experience? Why is this lesson relevant, and how will 
 
79. E.g., O’Leary, supra note 59; see infra Section I.C (providing examples of clinical teachers 
using reflective questioning to guide students through the three stages in the context of a trial 
and other lawyering activities). 
80. For illustrative purposes, this section provides specific examples of metacognitive reflec-
tive questions already in use in the context of legal education. It does not, however, touch upon 
the extensive literature on reflection, which crosses many disciplines and addresses a volumi-
nous range of issues. For a minute sampling of this literature, see DONALD SCHÖN, EDUCATING 
THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARD A NEW DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE 
PROFESSIONS (1987); Elaine Surbeck et al., Assessing Reflective Responses in Journals, 47 EDUC. 
LEADERSHIP 25 (1991); Christopher Branson, Improving Leadership by Nurturing Moral Conscious-
ness through Students’ Self-Reflection, 45 J. EDUC. ADMIN. 471 (2007); Paul. J. Silva & Ann G. Phil-
lips, Evaluating Self-Reflection and Insight as Self-Conscious Traits, 50 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 370 (2002); STEPHEN KEMMIS, ACTION RESEARCH AND THE POLITICS OF 
REFLECTION, IN REFLECTION: TURNING EXPERIENCE INTO LEARNING 139, 141 (David Boud et al. 
eds., 1985). 
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your new knowledge affect your future actions?”81 Such ques-
tions may be sufficient for very simple learning activities, or for 
those whose metacognitive skills are already well-developed.  
More comprehensive reflective questions are better suited for 
those engaging in complex material and/or who require train-
ing in the metacognitive process. Such questions walk students 
through each individual step of the metacognitive approach. 
For example, to help a student plan for producing a research 
memorandum or taking a midterm, faculty may ask her to: 
 “determine what skills are called for and in what 
form,” 
 “consider what resources are available, and” 
 “think about what generalized information from 
[the present course] or other courses might aid her 
inquiry.”82  
Once a student has performed—for example, after she sub-
mits the draft memorandum or sits for the midterm—post-per-
formance questions then guide her through the reflection stage. 
A student might be asked: 
 to predict her grade or other external feedback 
that she will receive; 
 to compare her prediction with the actual grade 
or feedback received; 
 to assess why her prediction was accurate or inac-
curate; 
 to articulate which specific aspects of the activity 
she performed well, and which she did not per-
form well; 
 
81. See, e.g., Lentz supra note 8, at 30–32 (explaining how reflective questions help students 
achieve learning goals and giving examples of helpful questions). 
82. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 58. 
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 to identify what contributed to those specific suc-
cesses and failures; and 
 to develop ways to address their shortcoming as 
she prepares for the next memorandum or exam.83  
Such questions walk students through the processes of self-
evaluation and self-improvement by focusing them on feedback 
from outside sources, but also heavily emphasize the genera-
tion of feedback by the students themselves.84 They also encour-
age students to actively use this feedback to strategically and 
intentionally design strategies for self-improvement.85  
Examples from the experiential learning context further 
demonstrate how reflective questioning guides students in ac-
tively generating much of their own metacognitive content. 
Ann Shalleck’s seminal article on clinical supervision demon-
strates this in the context of a faculty-student discussion during 
the early stages of trial preparation.86 Questions might include: 
 “What are the legal consequences of [certain facts 
presented by the client’s case]? . . . Think back to 
what you know about remedies from other cases 
. . .”  
 “What do you think the judge might think about 
the [] issues you’re raising?” 
 “Given the conflict you’ve identified [between 
your client’s interests and the judge’s interests], 
how can you appeal to values that help your cli-
ent?” 
 “[D]o you have a sense of which [witnesses] are 
the most important for your case theory?” 
 
83. See SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 242. 
84. See, e.g., Kowalski, supra note 35, at 57–58. 
85. See, e.g., id. 
86. Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 117–23 (1994). 
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 “You have hard choices to make—how to pick 
witnesses and structure each direct examination 
. . . . Remember our class discussion about inves-
tigation and its relation to case theory. Think 
about how each piece fits with the story you’re 
telling. When we meet next time, let’s talk about 
other ideas you may have and what you’ve de-
cided to do.”87 
These questions are carefully crafted to direct the students to 
grapple with the preparatory stages of the metacognitive pro-
cess, including identifying goals for the upcoming task (e.g., an-
ticipating potential doctrinal and judicial concerns), and identi-
fying resources and strategies to meet those goals (e.g., 
doctrinal knowledge from prior courses and trial strategies pre-
viously covered in the clinical seminar, including techniques for 
the effective use of case theory, witnesses, and direct examina-
tion).  
Clinical faculty also use reflective questioning to guide post-
performance evaluation and self-improvement. Professor Beryl 
Blaustone developed a thoughtful six-stage feedback model 
that asks a student who has just completed a moot, simulation, 
or live-client performance to reflect first on their performance 
strengths, and then on their weaknesses, in each case followed 
by peer reflections and faculty feedback.88 The model provides 
a rigorous, structured format for generating both internally- 
and externally-generated reflections to help the student evalu-
ate her performance and consider improvements for next time.89 
Clinical faculty use many different types of reflective question-
ing to guide students through the planning, performance, and 
reflection stages of all manners of lawyering activities, includ-
ing interactions with clients and opposing counsel, legal re-
search and writing, community education and legislative work, 
 
87. Id. at 117–21. 
88. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Law Students to Self-Critique and to Develop Critical Clinical Self-
Awareness in Performance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 143, 144 (2006). 
89. Id. 
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and various dispute resolution processes, such as mediations 
and negotiations.90  
As these examples show,91 both clinical and non-clinical edu-
cators use carefully crafted questions that intentionally require 
students to closely examine and articulate their own mental 
processes, thus engaging students deeply in generating their 
own learning. This is a hallmark of metacognitive approach and 
a key reason that it is so effective.92  
In designing reflective questions, faculty must carefully con-
sider what specific issues to direct students towards, factors 
such as the existing metacognitive skill level of the students and 
the complexity of the material being learned, and the appropri-
ate format (e.g., in writing, via group or individual discussion, 
via polling, etc.).93 Faculty must also consider the appropriate 
level of faculty review and oversight of metacognitive reflec-
tions, which may range from none (e.g., written answers that 
are never reviewed by faculty) to highly intensive (e.g., faculty 
provide multiple rounds of reflective questions on multiple 
drafts of court papers).  
In sum, reflective questioning is a core metacognitive tech-
nique that can be implemented in ways ranging from relatively 
 
90. See infra Section I.E. 
91. Many other examples abound in the literature. For an example from the externship con-
text, see LEARNING FROM PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 5–6 (proposing reflective questions for an 
extern who is drafting an order for a judge, such as “before you begin drafting the order, you 
will want to think through some personal goals for the project. . . . What specific skills you want 
to improve? What type of critique and feedback you want? You might discuss the task and 
review your learning goals with your faculty supervisor and seek the supervisor’s input.” After 
the “doing” stage of writing the order, the text suggests how one might “reflect, analyze, and 
integrate”: after getting feedback from the judge, “you could talk to the judge’s clerk to get 
another perspective. You could write a journal entry about your experience. You could talk to 
others or read articles about writing style or standards for reopening a default judgment. You 
can think about how to incorporate the judge’s suggestions. . . . [S]ome reflection and analysis 
should be you to integrate your learning from this experience with prior knowledge to create 
new, or to modify existing common knowledge.”) 
92. See infra Section III.B. 
93. See, e.g., Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 64–68 (suggesting that faculty with limited time 
to spend on metacognitive strategies can use technology such as learning blogs, message 
boards, comment functions, and online assessments). 
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simple94 to highly intensive, depending on the circumstances. It 
can also be supplemented with other techniques, such as requir-
ing students to draft their own metacognitive questions, take 
quizzes focused on metacognition, and articulate their revised 
understanding of the material after engaging in reflection.95 Fur-
ther examples of detailed, well-designed metacognitive exer-
cises that are adaptable to many contexts can be found in Pro-
fessor Schwartz’s textbook for incoming first-year students96 
and elsewhere throughout the literature.  
D. Metacognition and Curricular Reform 
As noted, the metacognitive approach is already employed 
within many curricular specialties, including courses focused 
on experiential learning, first-year students, legal research and 
writing, ethics, professional identity and development, and ac-
ademic support. However, the revolution is not being carried 
out only by individual educators in specialized corners of the 
curriculum. Curricular reform experts, tasked with improving 
legal education nationwide, have embraced key elements of the 
metacognitive process over the past several decades and have 
increasingly brought them into “mainstream” discourse. 
Among the most influential of these reform efforts are the 
sweeping accreditation changes adopted in 2014 by the ABA 
mandating that certain aspects of metacognitive training be in-
corporated into every law curriculum, as discussed below. 
Chief among these is the obligation to provide all law students 
with repeated opportunities for personal performance and 
 
94. See, e.g., Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 727 (Metacognition “may not be as onerous 
to integrate as one might think. The metacognitive task need not be overly complicated, and 
simple illustrations might suffice for introducing the skill to first-year students. Also, the class 
time a professor devotes to these exercises might be minimized by flipping some or all of this 
instruction out of class.”). 
95. See Elizabeth M. Bloom, Creating Desirable Difficulties: Strategies for Reshaping Teaching and 
Learning in the Law School Classroom, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 115, 135–50 (2018) [hereinafter 
Bloom III]. 
96. SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61. 
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reflection—activities that lie at the heart of the metacognitive 
process.  
Before discussing the accreditation mandates themselves, it is 
worthwhile to note that these mandates were preceded by three 
influential studies concerning the future of legal education that 
emphasized certain metacognitive principles. The first, popu-
larly referred to as the MacCrate Report, was issued in 1992 af-
ter three years of work by an ABA task force.97 Among other 
things, the MacCrate Report emphasized that lawyers must de-
velop skills in self-reflection and self-awareness, enabling them 
to engage in “lifelong learning” and continued intellectual 
growth even after formal education ends.98 These are hallmarks 
of the metacognitive process.99  
Two additional reports were issued a decade and a half later, 
in 2007, and later deemed by a special ABA committee as 
demonstrative of “the best thinking” of legal educators.100 These 
reports are known colloquially as the “Carnegie Report,”101 
which discussed the results of a two-year study commissioned 
by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 
and as “Best Practices,” produced by the Clinical Legal Educa-
tion Association.102 Among other things, both reports high-
lighted the importance of the cycle of planning, doing, and re-
flecting,103 with the Carnegie Report stating that students “must 
become ‘metacognitive’ about their own learning.”104  
 
97. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION 
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter 
MACCRATE REPORT]. 
98. Id., at 336. 
99. See infra Part III. 
100. LORI E. SHAW & VICTORIA L. VANZANDT, STUDENT LEARNING OUTCOMES AND LAW 
SCHOOL ASSESSMENT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 25 
(2015) (citing the conclusion of the Outcomes Measures Committee, appointed in 2008 by the 
ABA’s Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar).  
101. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION 
OF LAW 15–17 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. 
102. ROY STUCKEY, ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND ROADMAP 
vii (2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES]. 
103. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 101, at 107; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 102, at 126–27. 
104. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 101, at 173. 
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These reports were among those studied closely by the ABA 
as it undertook a comprehensive 8-year review of accreditation 
standards, resulting in monumental reforms adopted in 2014.105 
The revisions endorse elements of the metacognitive approach 
by requiring all accredited institutions to give students multiple 
opportunities for performance and reflection, as discussed be-
low.106 Under these new standards, every legal educator and ad-
ministrator must now grapple with the teachings of the meta-
cognitive revolution to some extent. 
A brief review of the accreditation standards will demon-
strate these points. The discussion begins with the standards for 
experiential education, which reflect the earliest embrace of 
metacognitive techniques, followed by a discussion of the 2014 
standards, which mandate certain techniques to be used 
throughout the law curriculum as a whole. 
1. Experiential standards 
Experiential learning standards were the first to emphasize 
student self-reflection, with the purpose of encouraging self-as-
sessment and self-evaluation. Since 2005, all schools were re-
quired to provide “substantial opportunities for . . . real-life 
practice experiences . . . designed to encourage reflection by 
students on their experiences . . . and the development of one’s 
ability to assess his or her performance and level of compe-
tence.”107 Today’s standards require that every student com-
plete six or more credit hours of experiential learning,108 which 
must offer multiple “opportunities for student performance, 
self-evaluation, and feedback.”109 Externships must additionally 
incorporate “ongoing, contemporaneous, faculty-guided 
 
105. SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 25–26. 
106. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12; see infra Section I.D.1. 
107. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW 
SCHOOLS 2005–2006 § 302(b)(1) (2005). Even earlier, the 2004–2005 standards required all field 
placements to “provide opportunities for student reflection on their . . . experience, through a 
seminar, regularly scheduled tutorials, or other means of guided reflection.” Id. at § 305(e)(7). 
108. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 303(a)(3). 
109. Id. at § 304(a)(3)–(4). 
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reflection.”110 These standards clearly emphasize fundamental 
metacognitive principles.  
2. Throughout the broader curriculum 
In 2014, the ABA adopted a requirement that the non-experi-
ential curriculum also provide multiple opportunities for stu-
dent performance, accompanied by feedback.111 All law schools 
must now not only employ summative assessments, which 
measure competency at the end of the course of study (e.g., a 
final exam), but also formative assessments, which measure stu-
dent competency while a course of study is ongoing (e.g., a mid-
term exam or other mid-course assignment).112 The critical dif-
ference between the two is that while summative assessment 
merely measures student learning at the close of the course, 
formative assessment gives students an opportunity to learn 
from the experience and to try do better on the next one; this is 
why formative assessment specifically must “provide[] mean-
ingful feedback to improve student learning.”113 While the ABA 
 
110. Id. at § 304(a)(5); see also Rebecca B. Rosenfeld, The Examined Externship Is Worth Doing: 
Critical Self-Reflection & Externship Pedagogy, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 127 (2014) (arguing that classes 
and educators should aid students in their reflections to foster present and future learning). 
111. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 314. Standard 314 does not require form-
ative assessment to be used in every course but does require that formative assessment be used 
within the law school curriculum as a whole. See SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 28. For 
the phased-in implementation timeline for this requirement, see AM. BAR ASS’N, Transition to 




112. 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 314 (Interpretation 314-1 states: “Form-
ative assessment methods are measurements at different points during a particular course or at 
different points over the span of a student’s education that provide meaningful feedback to 
improve student learning. Summative assessment methods are measurements at the culmina-
tion of a particular course or at the culmination of any part of a student’s legal education that 
measure the degree of student learning.”). 
113. Id.; see also SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 6–7 (“The best formative assessments 
involve individual feedback not only as to the product produced, but the process employed . . . 
instead of simply providing a numeric or letter grade [], it is important that [the] professor spe-
cifically identify what was wrong with [the work] product…ideally, [the] professor will also 
help the student explore the reasons for this failure. . . . Formative assessment helps a student 
see where in the learning process he made a wrong (or a correct) turn and make any needed 
changes on his next assignment.”). 
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did not define “meaningful feedback,” experts explain that it 
requires enough guidance to enable a student to reflect upon 
and improve her performance.114  
The formative-assessment-with-meaningful-feedback re-
quirement thus echoes the 3-phased metacognitive cycle. Schol-
arship linking metacognition and formative assessment has 
blossomed since the ABA standards were proposed, with one 
scholar noting that when administering formative assessments, 
“it is critical to reinforce metacognition and self-regulated 
learning principles by stating that receiving the score or written 
feedback is not the end of the learning process. In fact, receiving 
the grade is somewhere in the middle of the process. The next 
step is to evaluate one’s process, attribute the results, and plan 
for future assignments.”115Along these lines, the ABA further 
recommends that all law schools consider training students in 
“self-evaluation.”116 At least 24 schools have already adopted ei-
ther “reflection” or “evaluation” as an official learning out-
come.117 This recommendation is yet another way that the ABA 
today promotes metacognitive concepts as fundamental to the 
process of learning law. 
 
114. See 2018–2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 314; Elizabeth Ruiz Frost, Feedback 
Distortion: The Shortcomings of Model Answers as Formative Feedback, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 938, 942 
(2016) (“Feedback is not truly formative unless it helps a student develop her learning strategies 
or knowledge to a higher degree than before the particular assessment event.”). 
115. Cara Cunningham Warren, Achieving the American Bar Association’s Pedagogy Mandate: 
Empowerment in the Midst of a “Perfect Storm,” 14 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 67, 99 (2014); see also, e.g., 
Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, The Pedagogy of Problem Solving: Applying Cognitive Science to Teaching 
Legal Problem Solving, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 699, 754 (2012); Steven I. Friedland, Rescuing Pluto 
from the Cold: Creating an Assessment-Centered Legal Education, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 592, 605 (2018).  
116. The suggestion arises in the context of the ABA’s requirement that every law school 
articulate its curricular goals in the form of “learning outcomes,” or the professional competen-
cies deemed to be so fundamental that every student must receive instruction in those compe-
tencies. See 2018-2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 301. 
Some learning outcomes are mandatory, while others are not mandatory but are suggested. See 
id. at § 302. 
117. Jodi S. Balsam et al., Assessing Law Students As Reflective Practitioners, 62 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 49, 52 (2018). For example, Alexander Blewett III School of Law identifies “the capacity for 
self-reflection as key to continuous learning, self-improvement, and self-development.” Our 
Mission, Goals, and Graduates, UNIV. OF MONT., https://www.umt.edu/law/files/admissions/stu-
dent-learning-outcomes.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2019). 
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3. Institutional mandate 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the metacognitive revolution is 
transforming not only the classroom, but the institutional ac-
creditation process itself. The ABA now requires every law 
school to metacognitively assess and improve its own curricu-
lum.118 The standards state that every institution must “conduct 
ongoing evaluation of [its] program of legal education, learning 
outcomes, and assessment methods; and shall use the results of 
this evaluation to determine the degree of student attainment 
of competency in the learning outcomes and to make appropri-
ate changes to improve the curriculum.”119 This requires peri-
odic evaluation by each institution of a representative cross-sec-
tion of students120 for the purpose of assessing whether the 
institution is succeeding in teaching its required competen-
cies.121 
This institutional assessment process also mimics the 3-phase 
“plan, do, reflect” metacognitive cycle by requiring planning 
and goal setting (schools must designate learning outcomes and 
determine how to achieve them); focusing on institutional per-
formance (whether a school’s students in fact achieve compe-
tency); and requiring institutional self-evaluation and the iden-
tification of improvements for the future.122 Thus, the ABA 
demands that not only students, but faculty and their institu-
tions as a whole, must now routinely engage in the metacogni-
tive process. 
 
118. 2018-2019 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 12, at § 315. 
119. Id. 
120. SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 28 (“Periodic measures of the performance of 
sample groups of students provide snapshots of whether your school is achieving its outcomes. 
Institutional outcomes assessment uses your students’ collective performance as a measure of 
your school’s performance.”). 
121. Id. at 26 (“Outcomes Assessment is a way to require schools to identify exactly what 
competencies they seek to provide and to take a hard look at whether they are actually gradu-
ating students who possess those competencies.”). 
122. SHAW &VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 26, 28; Heagney, supra note 59. 
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E. Experiential Theory and Practice 
The discussion above draws examples from both the non-ex-
periential and experiential realms to illustrate the components 
of the metacognitive revolution. Given that prior literature on 
metacognition in legal education very rarely refers to clinical 
theory and practice,123 it is helpful to briefly explain why this 
article takes a different approach. 
As demonstrated above, metacognition and experiential 
methodology share a number of foundational principles and 
practices. Both treat the performance of a task as the central cat-
alyst for learning.124 Experts in both realms widely embrace the 
same teaching techniques,125 such as the 3-phase cycle and re-
flective questioning, and emphasize the same educational ben-
efits, including lifelong learning skills,126 transfer skills, and stu-
dent empowerment.127 A seminal article from 1984 on clinical 
methodology refers to the “development of ‘models of analysis 
for understanding past experience and for predicting and plan-
ning future conduct’” that uses reflective questioning focused 
on goal identification, strategy selection, self-evaluation, and 
 
123. The connection between metacognition and clinical theory and practice is sometimes 
noted in passing. See, e.g., Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 738 (noting that clinical peda-
gogy is explicit about its teaching of the metacognitive process); Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 
380–81 (noting that clinics use and write about metacognition); Anzalone, supra note 13, at 92 
(stating that clinics write the most about reflection); Kowalski, supra note 35, at 85 (noting that 
clinics sometimes use the transfer skills she espouses). Other passing references appear to assert 
that there is no connection. See, e.g., Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1082, 1090 (stating that expe-
riential learning pedagogy “needs to be constructed with acute awareness of the need to incul-
cate metacognitive skills” and describing the first advocacy of metacognition in the law curric-
ulum as occurring in 1988); Shaw, supra note 24, at 1284 (identifying “another factor—one that 
proponents of contextual or experiential learning have missed”—as “the crucial need for stu-
dents to master metacognition as an integral part of being a good lawyer”). 
124. See, e.g., Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933); 
Anthony G. Amsterdam, A Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 612, 616–17 (1984) ; DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS A SOURCE OF 
LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (Amy Neidlinger et al., eds., 2d ed. 2014).  
125. While not all clinicians universally adhere to the same methods and principles, after an 
extensive literature review, Professor Carolyn Grose articulated a number of principles at the 
core of a “diffuse consensus” on the clinical approach. Grose, supra note 28, at 491–92. 
126. “Clinical pedagogy aims to teach students how to learn.” Id. at 494–95.  
127. See infra Section III.B. 
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self-improvement—a statement that equally describes the met-
acognitive approach.128 
The focus on self-reflection as a catalyst for self-improvement 
is especially well-documented in the clinical literature. Decades 
ago, experts were already exploring the practical and theoreti-
cal bases for using reflection as a primary tool for learning and 
improvement. In 1979, for example, David Barnhizer wrote 
about the clinical use of reflection to prompt students to explore 
their professional responsibilities,129 and in 1981, Kenneth Kreil-
ing cited Donald Schön’s influential theory130 of “professional 
practice” or “theories in action” to explain how clinicians de-
velop students’ self-reflection skills.131 Today, this emphasis on 
“[d]eliberate and systematic reflection”132 remains one of the 
three most dominant clinical teaching methodologies, such that 
“[t]he bottom line is that clinical pedagogy aims to teach stu-
dents to approach lawyering as a theory-driven practice, fram-
ing each activity with intentionality and reflection.”133 
 
128. Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 617. 
129. David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: Its Theory and Implementation, 
30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 67, 147 (1979) (pointing out that clinical methodology “consistently creates 
the opportunity, structure, and motivation for law students reflectively and critically to analyze 
their own personal systems and attitudes of professional responsibility in an internalized, non-
abstract setting, prior to their being subjected to the intense and distorting pressures of the post-
graduate legal profession.”). 
130. See CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD SCHÖN, THEORY IN PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL 
EFFECTIVENESS 1–20 (1974). 
131. Kenneth R. Kreiling, Clinical Education and Lawyer Competency: The Process of Learning to 
Learn from Experience Through Properly Structured Clinical Supervision, 40 MD. L. REV. 284, 289–90 
(1981).  
132. Grose, supra note 28, at 500. 
133. Id. at 493, 500 (“Reflection is the method that guides students’ extraction of theory from 
practice, and the application of practice to theory; and it pushes students to generalize from the 
specific and transfer their learning beyond that specific. The role of the clinical teacher is ‘to . . . 
enhance self-reflection, self-consciousness and a more encompassing understanding of those 
phenomena of the legal order which are the focus of pedagogic inquiry.’”); see also Barry et al., 
supra note 12, at 72; Casey, supra note 15, at 331–48; Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflec-
tive Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 623, 637–40 (2003); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice 
Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism & Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1649–52 (1991) (“The 
success of [placing students in lawyering roles] as pedagogy depends on the employment of a 
method of careful and sensitive review throughout the planning and evaluation process. Such 
a review should encompass a scrupulous self-assessment to help students understand what has 
transpired and plan future conduct.”). 
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Given the close alignments between the metacognitive and 
clinical approaches, it is not surprising that a leading scholar 
has already examined the symmetries between them in the con-
text of non-legal education.134 Nor is it surprising that legal 
scholars celebrated a foundational 1978 clinical textbook as “an 
example of metacognition at its best,” 135 correlating the text-
book’s major themes with the key components of metacognition 
as defined by the inventor of that term.136 Furthermore, it is not 
surprising that much of the metacognition scholarship on non-
experiential law teaching is in fact produced by those who also 
teach experiential courses.137 
What is surprising, however, is the lack of discussion about 
how experiential and non-experiential scholarship on metacog-
nitive principles can inform and strengthen each other. A pos-
sible explanation for this absence is that clinicians themselves 
do not often use the term “metacognition,” perhaps because 
that term had not yet entered academic discourse by the time 
that foundational works of clinical scholarship were being writ-
ten.138 Another possible reason is that faculty who teach clinical 
 
134. See Alice Y. Kolb & David A. Kolb, The Learning Way: Meta-cognitive Aspects of Experien-
tial Learning, 40 SIMULATION & GAMING 297 (2009). 
135. John M. A. DiPippa & Martha M. Peters, The Lawyering Process: An Example of Metacog-
nition at Its Best, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 311, 312 (2003) (discussing GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, 
THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978) as part 
of a symposium celebrating its 25th anniversary and its influence on the field of clinical law 
teaching); see also Leah Wortham, The Lawyering Process: My Thanks for the Book and the Movie, 10 
CLINICAL L. REV. 399, 406 (2003). 
136. DiPippa & Peters, supra note 135.  
137. See Elizabeth Adamo Usman, Making Legal Education Stick: Using Cognitive Science to 
Foster Long-Term Learning in the Legal Writing Classroom, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 386–87 
(2016). 
138. See e.g., DiPippa & Peters, supra note 135, at 315 (“Without using the term metacogni-
tion, Bellow and Moulton embraced a metacognitive approach that only later was formally in-
troduced to learning theory.”); accord id. at 315 n.20 (“Metacognition as a defined process devel-
oped around the mid to late 70s the same time that THE LAWYERING PROCESS was being written. 
John H. Flavell was the first to define and use this term.”). Another possible reason is that clin-
ical and non-clinical teaching are seen as too distinct to engage in productive dialogue; admit-
tedly, engaging in the actual practice of law creates learning opportunities of unique intensity 
and complexity that cannot be replicated in nonclinical settings, see, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 
124, at 616–17, and differences naturally exist in how metacognitive theory is applied in non-
clinical and clinical settings. However, these differences do not mean that important concepts 
and ideas cannot be translated from one setting to another. 
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courses too often receive no institutional support for the pro-
duction of scholarship, which limits academic dialogue.139 
Whatever the reasons, the gap between clinical and metacogni-
tion scholarship hinders the productive cross-fertilization of 
ideas. 
Part III of this article offers a first contribution towards clos-
ing this gap. Prior to turning to that effort, however, Part II ex-
plains the benefits of the metacognitive approach and why it 
deserves such extensive attention. 
II. THE POWER OF THE REVOLUTION 
Having demonstrated how broadly and deeply the metacog-
nitive revolution is already embedded into the law curriculum, 
the next question is: why does this revolution matter? The short 
answer is that metacognition can dramatically improve all man-
ners of legal competencies. It also develops the skills necessary 
for continued intellectual growth after formal education ends 
and enhances the elusive, yet critically important qualities of 
“good judgment” and “intelligence.” These and other powerful 
implications of the metacognitive approach are discussed be-
low. 
A. Metacognition Strengthens Competencies 
1. Legal competencies 
As demonstrated above, the metacognitive process is taught 
contemporaneously with other material that is fundamental to 
legal analysis. The underlying content may be doctrinal content 
alone; doctrinal analysis combined with methods of communi-
cating with others about the law, such as a client or tribunal; the 
exploration of moral and ethical dimensions of the law; or any 
 
139. See, e.g., ROBERT R. KUEHN & DAVID A. SANTACROCE WITH MARGARET RUETER & SUE 
SCHECHTER, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION, THE 2016-17 SURVEY OF 
APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION (2017); Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of ABA Stand-
ards for Clinical Faculty, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 183, 191 (2008); Barry et al., supra note 12, at 74–75; Cf. 
Mary Beth Beazley, Finishing the Job of Legal Education Reform, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 275, 295 
(2016) (encouraging enhanced status for legal writing faculty). 
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other material. Whatever the underlying content, metacognitive 
thinking results in deeper learning of that content.140 Metacog-
nition has also been shown to improve students’ abilities to in-
tegrate out-of-classroom experiences and personal values with 
classroom learning and to gather feedback and use it to improve 
performance, as well as to increase student engagement and 
motivation.141 
Most empirical literature on the benefits of metacognition ex-
ists in non-law contexts142 and provides overwhelming evi-
dence of its educational value; as previously noted, hundreds 
of studies link certain aspects of metacognitive learning to bet-
ter educational outcomes, and as that body research is well-cov-
ered elsewhere, it need not be explored here.143 As for the law-
specific context, the benefits of metacognition have been touted 
by the ABA and the authors of the MacCrate Report, the Carne-
gie Report, and Best Practices among others.144 Faculty who 
teach the metacognitive approach also report improvement in 
student competencies as measured both through their own ob-
servations145 and through empirical studies. After teaching two 
pilot sections of his course for first-year students on core legal 
analysis skills and metacognitive skills,146 for example, Profes-
sor Schwartz found that 90% of students demonstrated 
 
140. For an extensive review of the literature, see Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 466–67, 472–84; 
Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 723 n.55 (citing “notable support for the theory that inte-
grating the teaching of metacognitive skills with the teaching of substantive content can im-
prove students’ deep learning of the subject matter”). 
141. For just one discussion of the many benefits of metacognitive training, see Lentz, supra 
note 8, at 38–39. 
142. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 473–75 (citing only 4 studies in the context of legal educa-
tion). 
143. See id. at 472; infra Section II.D; see also Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1062. 
144. See infra Section II.D; see also Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 467–68. 
145. One anecdotal example provided by a legal writing professor, reports that metacogni-
tive exercises helped her students generate their own highly productive advice to themselves, 
such as to “(1) read cases more carefully; (2) outline before they write; (3) allow more time for 
correcting citation before the assignment is due; and (4) spend more time thinking before writ-
ing.” Joi Montiel, Empower the Student, Liberate the Professor: Self-Assessment by Comparative Anal-
ysis, 39 S. ILL. U. L.J. 249, 251–52 (2015). 
146. Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 484. 
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competency on the final exam with respect to case reading and 
case briefing.147 
Empirical studies conducted by Professor Andrea Curcio in 
her civil procedure and evidence courses also demonstrate the 
value of metacognitive techniques. In the first study, students 
who took practice essay questions with feedback performed 
better on average on the final exam than students who took no 
formative assessments.148 A second study gave some students 
not just formative assessments but also metacognitive reflective 
exercises; an impressive 70% of these students scored nearly a 
full letter grade higher than those who participated in neither 
formative assessments nor reflective exercises.149 Importantly, 
the addition of reflective exercises also enabled some students 
with low first-year GPAs to “catch up” with and perform as 
well as their better-credentialed peers, while formative assess-
ments alone only benefited those with already-strong LSAT 
scores and GPAs.150 Thus, these studies suggest both the bene-
fits of formative assessments, and that additional metacognitive 
reflection exercises can provide even greater benefits to a 
greater number and wider range of students, including some 
with low first-year grades. 
2. Intelligence 
Metacognition has been shown to not only enhance learning 
within specific law courses, but to maximize intelligence itself. 
By improving higher-order thinking such as analysis and syn-
thesis, and by enabling transfer of concepts between seemingly 
disparate contexts, 
[m]etacognition enhances intelligence and in-
creases the ability to learn and to perform 
 
147. Id. at 505. 
148. Andrea A. Curcio, Gregory Todd Jones, & Tanya M. Washington, Developing an Empir-
ical Model to Test Whether Required Writing Exercises or Other Changes in Large-Section Law Class 
Teaching Methodologies Result in Improved Exam Performance, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 195, 196 (2007); 
Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 383–84. 
149. Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 395.  
150. Id. at 401.  
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thinking tasks––it is the skill that maximizes the 
utility of intelligence. Thus, students with lesser 
intellectual ability who have greater metacogni-
tive skills often demonstrate academic perfor-
mance similar to students with higher intellectual 
ability. For instance, one study found that “intel-
lectual ability uniquely accounted for 10% of var-
iance in learning performance, metacognitive 
skillfulness uniquely accounted for 17% of vari-
ance in learning performance, while both predic-
tors shared another 22% of variance in learning.” 
Thus, metacognitive abilities combined with in-
telligence are a greater predictor of learning per-
formance than intelligence alone.151 
Preston further cites studies finding that among students of 
similar intelligence levels, those who received metacognitive 
training outperformed peers who did not,152 and that students 
initially performing at an average level (fiftieth percentile) can 
rise to the top quarter by using metacognitive strategies.153 
3. Lifelong learning 
Metacognitive training also empowers students with an effec-
tive method of learning that will benefit them throughout their 
lifetimes.154 A strong metacognitive thinker is a “lifelong” 
learner, meaning that no matter what new intellectual chal-
lenges she faces throughout her career, she can master that chal-
lenge with relative efficiency.155 As one scholar puts it, metacog-
nitive training “teach[es] students how to fish.”156 Another 
 
151. Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1060–61. 
152. Id. at 1061. 
153. Id. at 1061–62. However, other studies suggest that a high or low GPA could not be 
predicted solely by the students’ level of metacognition. Id. at 1071. 
154. See, e.g., Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 468–71 (“Teaching students how to be lifelong learn-
ers is, in fact, the core goal of the self-regulated learning movement.”); Alleva & Gundlach, supra 
note 48, at 724. 
155. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 8, at 21. 
156. Grose, supra note 28, at 501. 
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describes it as “the beginning of the students’ development of 
conscious, rigorous self-evaluative methodologies for learning 
from experience — the kind of learning that makes law school 
the beginning, not the end, of a lawyer’s legal education.”157 
The continued capacity to learn is critical for lawyers, who 
certainly do not graduate from law school or obtain a law li-
cense having learned everything necessary to practice compe-
tently.158 Both student lawyers and experienced lawyers con-
stantly must learn new areas of legal doctrine and changes to 
doctrine previously studied, as well as aspects of non-legal dis-
ciplines such as forensic science and business contexts.159 The 
ability to self-teach is especially important given that lawyers 
often practice with significant independence, and very often in 
practice areas not covered in the classroom.160 The capacity for 
lifelong learning is viewed by many as a more valuable skill 
than the acquisition of doctrinal knowledge or concrete lawyer-
ing skills. 161 It is critical for all law students to acquire this skill, 
as research suggests that even academic high achievers, such as 
those admitted to law school, do not necessarily know how to 
learn.162 In fact, some suggest that those with stronger academic 
records need the most intensive metacognitive training, since 
they may fail less often and thus are less experienced in self-
 
157. Amsterdam, supra note 124, at 617. 
158. “Law is a thirty- or forty-year course of study.” Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1076; see 
also, e.g., SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 101, at 173 (“Professional schools cannot directly teach 
students to be competent in any and all situations; rather, the essential goal of professional 
schools must be to form practitioners who are aware of what it takes to become competent in 
their chosen domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and motivation to pursue 
genuine expertise.”).  
159. See, e.g., Niedwiecki I, supra note 1, at 153–54. 
160. See Grose, supra note 28, at 500–01. 
161. See, e.g., Beryl Blaustone, Improving Clinical Judgment in Lawyering with Multidisciplinary 
Knowledge About Brain Function and Human Behavior for Effective Lawyering, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 
607, 613 (2011) (discussing how BEST PRACTICES, supra note 102, focuses on self-regulated learn-
ing rather than substantive law knowledge); Bloom III, supra note 95, at 118 (commenting that 
a “universal” critique is that education focuses on “delivering content” instead of teaching stu-
dents how to effectively learn). 
162. Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 720. 
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reflection and self-improvement.163 Thus, high performers with 
weak metacognitive skills might fail when faced with new and 
challenging situations, such as when attempting to “learn on 
the job,” while those who may not have strong academic rec-
ords but who have strong metacognitive skills can more suc-
cessfully meet such challenges. 
4. Sound judgment 
In addition to developing lifelong learning skills, metacogni-
tion builds “good judgment.” Among other things, good judg-
ment enables a lawyer to “grasp[] the point of legal rules and 
discern[] the legally and morally salient features of particular 
fact situations.”164 While sound judgment can be developed 
through extensive life experience,165 it develops more quickly 
and more effectively when experience is coupled with metacog-
nitive reflection.166 A long line of academic literature167 supports 
the premise that reflection “forces the professional to increase 
awareness of the factors that affect judgment” by producing a 
“higher level of awareness and consciousness of the decision-
making process.”168 Accordingly, strengthening students’ legal 
judgment and decision-making capacities, especially in the face 
of ambiguity, is a central goal of the clinical movement, which 
seeks to “guide [students] to recognize choice moments and to 
be able to make intentional choices in the face of uncertainty. 
Simply put . . . : ‘[I]f we [as clinicians] are not teaching our 
 
163. Anzalone, supra note 13, at 93–94; cf. Frost, supra note 114, at 947–48 (2016) (“Students 
who perform well on assessments tend to have stronger metacognitive skills.”). 
164. Lawrence B. Solum, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: A Tournament of Virtue, 
32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1385 (2005).  
165. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 8, at 22. 
166. See Casey, supra note 15, at 318; see also, e.g., Blaustone, supra note 161; D. Don. Welch, 
“What’s Going On?” in the Law School Curriculum, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1607, 1620 (2005) (discussing 
the development of judgment through repeated experience, consideration of the full context, 
reflection, and other techniques).  
167. For a detailed discussion of academic literature focused on reflection, see Casey, supra 
note 15. 
168. Id. at 321. 
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students to recognize other choices, we have failed.’”169 In short, 
by asking students to identify factors that might affect legal de-
cision-making, and to intentionally choose the elements appro-
priate for the context, metacognition teaches students the think-
ing processes that help to create “good judgment.”170 
5. Transfer 
Metacognition holds particular promise for legal education 
because it strengthens a core legal skill: the ability to transfer 
and adapt complex, abstract principles to new contexts.171 
Transfer is so fundamental to the enterprise of legal thinking 
that clinical educators have deemed it “the heart of clinical ped-
agogy … [and its] theoretical base.”172 Transfer takes place 
when familiar doctrine and skills are applied to facts different 
from those addressed by precedent, and when unfamiliar doc-
trine is learned using legal research and analysis skills previ-
ously applied in other contexts. Transfer is what enables law-
yers to adapt their advocacy skills to different settings, whether 
that setting is an administrative hearing, a negotiation with op-
posing counsel, or a presentation to a corporate board. A lawyer 
must even “argue both sides” so that she can successfully antic-
ipate and defend against counterarguments, requiring her to 
 
169. Grose, supra note 28, at 494–95, 501 (describing one of “the jurisprudential and peda-
gogical themes of the clinical movement” as the “necessity of making choices about professional 
role and behavior” in light of indeterminacy and uncertainty.”). See generally Jane Aiken, Social 
Justice Provocateurs, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 287 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of uncovering 
assumptions). 
170. See, e.g., Susan D. Bennett, Embracing the Ill-Structured Problem in A Community Economic 
Development Clinic, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 45, 62 (2002) (referring to metacognition as useful for 
developing the “wisdom” or “equanimity” needed for complex problem solving); R. Michael 
Cassidy, Beyond Practical Skills: Nine Steps for Improving Legal Education Now, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1515, 
1520–22 (2012) (discussing how problem solving is one of the most important skills for an attor-
ney); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward a Theory of 
Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 72–73 (2011). 
171. Transfer is a “core goal of all instruction,” not just of legal education, but the transfer 
of prior knowledge to new contexts is a continual exercise for the legal thinker. See Schwartz II, 
supra note 23, at 366; see also Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-School Cognitive Science 
the Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: J. ALWD 39, 72 (2016) 
(“Adaptive expertise is fueled by a deep-seated metacognitive knowledge.”).  
172. Grose, supra note 28, at 494. 
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flexibly transfer the same facts and legal principles to support 
the opposite conclusion. 
Metacognition is known as “the gold standard of transfer 
tools”173 for a number of reasons. Metacognition training asks 
thinkers to carefully examine the legal skill they are being 
taught and to identify its purposes.174 By understanding the 
thinking process and what outcomes it is used to achieve, the 
thinker can also understand its potential usefulness in other, 
disparate settings. The metacognitive thinker is even explicitly 
asked, at the beginning of the twelve-step cycle, to assess what 
she already knows that might be relevant to the new task at 
hand—an exercise that in itself hones the skill of transfer.175 Sim-
ilarly, it is an act of transfer to intentionally use past experience 
to improve future performance under changed circumstances, 
which is the very essence of the metacognitive process.176 
B. Students Serve as Self-Change Agents 
A final reason that the metacognitive process is a revolution-
ary tool for law teaching is that it explicitly puts the power to 
achieve excellence into the students’ own hands.177 By assigning 
students a primary role in generating their own intellectual 
growth, the metacognitive approach rebuts common assump-
tions that academic success is primarily determined by forces 
beyond a person’s own control, such as innate talent or faculty 
caprice.178 Metacognitive theory conveys that students them-
selves exercise significant control over their own success, which 
is fitting, since only the student herself can explore, assess, and 
improve the inner workings of her own mind. This premise is 
simple but consequential. It not only produces stronger legal 
 
173. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 101; see also Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 723.  
174. See, e.g., Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 723. 
175. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 73 (“Metacognition requires a ‘deliberate effort’ on the part 
of students to connect new knowledge to already-familiar concepts.”). 
176. See id. at 73–74. 
177. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 48, at 8. 
178. See Bloom II, supra note 33, at 319. 
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analysis and more well-developed ethical identities, but also 
improves motivation, engagement, and mental health.179 
A number of learning theories explain why explicitly shifting 
power to students results in improved outcomes. The theory of 
“self-efficacy,” which is supported by a vast body of academic 
literature,180 holds that people perform better when they believe 
that their own actions influence their outcomes.181 Self-efficacy 
is the opposite of the helpless feeling developed when one be-
lieves that one’s intellectual capabilities are limited by nature or 
that grading systems are arbitrary.182 Such beliefs may lead stu-
dents to not even try to improve, since they presume that per-
sonal effort will reap no reward. In contrast, those with self-ef-
ficacy have confidence that their own actions make a 
meaningful difference to their success, which motivates self-ac-
tion and self-improvement. 
Educational theory also suggests that people who experience 
“autonomy” have more successful outcomes. Autonomy in this 
context means that the learner has personally endorsed a learn-
ing technique as important, useful, or otherwise of value to her 
personally, rather than adopting the strategy merely because an 
external authority has imposed it.183 The metacognitive 
 
179. Id. 
180. Studies have specifically linked self-efficacy with better educational outcomes. See 
Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 478. See also Usman, supra note 138, at 372 (stating that efficacy is 
related to mindset theory, which “holds that one single factor—a student’s belief that intelli-
gence is either fixed or malleable— profoundly affects the student’s ability to learn from failure, 
and therefore, in effect, to successfully employ the self-regulated learning cycle”). 
181. See Bloom II, supra note 33, at 319. 
182. See, e.g., id. at 329 (“The first step toward creating effective self-regulated learners is 
convincing my students that they can learn to be self-regulating and control their own learn-
ing.”). 
183. Paula J. Manning, Understanding the Impact of Inadequate Feedback: A Means to Reduce Law 
Student Psychological Distress, Increase Motivation, & Improve Learning Outcomes, 43 CUMB. L. REV. 
225, 229–30 (2013) (“Autonomy is different from the concept of independence. Independence 
means not relying on or being influenced by external sources, whereas autonomy allows for 
external influences so long as those influences are self-endorsed. For instance, a student could 
view the action of completing an assignment (which comes from an external source) as either 
compliance with an external directive (i.e., because the student was told to do it), which is not 
autonomous, or as a means to learn a skill the student believes is important (i.e., because the 
student wants to learn how to analyze a legal problem and believes the assignment will help 
her do that), which is autonomous.” (citations omitted)). 
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approach encourages autonomy by asking students to deter-
mine what they need to improve, why, and how. Consequently, 
it generates highly personalized feedback, tailored to the indi-
vidual’s own unique thought processes and learning styles in a 
way that only the individual herself can offer.184 
Studies indicate that those with self-efficacy and autonomy 
perform better than others because of an increased motivation 
to act, an increased sense of reward, and deepened personal 
connections to the material being taught, among other things.185 
These studies comport with law faculty experiments demon-
strating that students with a sense of autonomy had higher 
grade point averages, greater success on bar examinations, and 
more self-generated motivation.186 
Qualities such as efficacy and autonomy also improve the 
thinker’s mental health, which not only further improves per-
formance but is a good in its own right. Students who under-
stand how to achieve intellectually, and who feel personally 
empowered to make such achievement happen, are less likely 
to be disconnected, passive, and frustrated, and more likely to 
be motivated, enthusiastic, and more deeply engaged in aca-
demic endeavors.187 Reported mental health statistics for law 
students and lawyers vary, but nearly all are alarming.188 Those 
practicing law are reportedly more likely to experience alcohol-
ism, divorce, suicide, and medical problems than the rest of the 
general population.189 Those entering law school reportedly ex-
perience depression at normal rates of 8-9%, but by graduation 
the rate more than quadruples to 40%.190 To the extent that 
 
184. See Kowalski, supra note 35, at 72–74 (explaining that metacognition encourages stu-
dents to understand their own learning styles). 
185. Manning, supra note 183, at 230–31. 
186. Id. at 230. 
187. See, e.g., Bloom II, supra note 33, at 319, 324-25; Lentz, supra note 8 at 38–39. 
188. See, e.g., Debra Austin & Rob Durr, Emotion Regulation for Lawyers: A Mind Is a Challeng-
ing Thing to Tame, 16 WYO. L REV 387, 387 (2016); Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: 
Tapping into the Informational Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 
667, 669 (1994); A. Rachel Camp, Creating Space for Silence in Law School Collaborations, 65 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 897, 903–06 (2016). 
189. Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1079. 
190. Lentz, supra note 8, at 38–39. 
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feelings of disempowerment, frustration, and disappointment 
in their learning environment contribute to this epidemic, the 
metacognitive approach may aid in reversing it. 
In short, metacognition offers a path to more effective, more 
efficient intellectual growth, with concomitant benefits for emo-
tional well-being. This is a critical offering at this time, when 
law schools are performing inadequately, according to various 
indicators such as low bar passage rates,191 critiques from em-
ployers,192 low enrollment,193 high levels of student depres-
sion,194 and low levels of student motivation195 and engage-
ment.196 Certainly, no single silver bullet can solve these 
concerns. But the metacognitive process holds powerful prom-
ise to reshape legal education in ways that will produce more 
competent, healthier legal thinkers with the skills to develop 
their own ethical and moral identity, which benefits not only 
students, but also clients, employers, faculty, law schools, and 
the justice system overall.197 
III. METACOGNITIVE THEORY: THE MEANING OF MEANINGFUL 
FEEDBACK 
The metacognitive approach is already deeply embedded 
into some parts of the law curriculum, and its influence contin-
ues to spread. Of all of the recent accreditation changes, the 
 
191. Marsha Griggs, Building A Better Bar Exam, 7 TEX. A&M L. REV. 1, 2 (2019). 
192. See, e.g., Robert J. Derocher, What’s Going on in Legal Education?, A.B.A. (2012), https:
//www.americanbar.org/groups/bar_services/publications/bar_leader/2011_12/spring/le-
galed/. 
193. Jack Miller, Law Schools Face Diminished Enrollment Numbers, HEIGHTS (Feb. 10, 2019), 
https://bcheights.com/2019/02/10/law-schools-face-diminished-enrollment-numbers/. 
194. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 8, at 38–39; Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the 
Dark Side of Law School and Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 112 (2002). 
195. See, e.g., Kennon M Sheldon & Lawrence S Krieger, Does Legal Education Have Under-
mining Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, BEHAV. 
SCI. & L., 261 (2004) (describing the mental effects legal education has on law students). 
196. LAW SCHOOL SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, STUDENT ENGAGEMENT IN LAW 
SCHOOL: IN CLASS AND BEYOND (2010) http://lssse.indiana.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01
/2010_LSSSE_Annual_Survey_Results.pdf. 
197. See  supra notes 13, 15. 
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mandate to use “formative assessment with meaningful feed-
back” throughout the curriculum is the one that will require the 
largest number of individual law teachers to start using meta-
cognitive techniques in their classrooms.198 This mandate is 
technically very narrow in scope—it requires just one of the 
twelve metacognitive steps, namely, student performance of a 
task (step 7), and the ABA does not define “meaningful feed-
back,” which raises the real risk of very weak implementation 
by those unfamiliar with how metacognitive concepts are the 
driving force behind the mandate. As discussed below, this 
omission puts the mandate at risk of failing. Nevertheless, the 
mandate is an important milestone in that it creates broad new 
opportunities for exploring the most effective way to imple-
ment metacognitive theory in legal education. This is critical, 
because as the use of these techniques increases, so does the re-
sponsibility to ensure that they are used effectively. Implement-
ing the mandate broadly, but poorly, would be highly counter-
productive and would cause professional, institutional, and 
personal damage by failing to significantly increase profes-
sional competencies, while at the same time squandering fac-
ulty and institutional resources and reinforcing students’ feel-
ings of helplessness, defeatism, and disengagement by 
promising positive results but not delivering them.  
It is thus imperative to critically examine metacognitive the-
ory for vulnerabilities and to refine it so that the formative as-
sessment mandate is more likely to be properly implemented. 
This is especially important given how narrow the mandate is; 
since such a small slice of the metacognitive approach is man-
dated, that slice must be implemented very effectively if educa-
tional benefits are to result. This section therefore seeks to ad-
dress an important vulnerability that could thwart the success 
of the formative assessment mandate: the vagueness of the con-
cept of “meaningful feedback.” Since the mandate was pro-
posed, a flurry of literature has discussed many productive 
ideas of what good feedback looks like, especially in the context 
 
198. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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of a traditional midterm exam and an accompanying model an-
swer, which is a common means of meeting the formative as-
sessment mandate due to its familiarity and perceived effi-
ciency. 199 This literature and its focus on techniques for 
providing better feedback is valuable and necessary. At the 
same time, however, this article argues that a broader theory of 
what constitutes “meaningful feedback” is needed, and it de-
rives this theory from the metacognitive approach as the under-
lying basis for the mandate itself.  
This article proposes a conceptual vision of what constitutes 
improved feedback. This vision has two parts. The first explains 
why the common technique of a midterm-with-a-model-an-
swer will not fulfill the meaningful-feedback mandate and pro-
poses a framework for choosing feedback strategies that will. 
Second, it proposes that most feedback will also become inher-
ently more meaningful if faculty first engage in the deconstruc-
tion and abstraction, or “naming,” of the legal thinking pro-
cesses or techniques that they want students to master. As 
discussed below, the use of “naming” as a crucial step in the 
metacognitive process is supported by experts in many realms, 
including clinical educators, “transfer” theory experts, and 
those who employ the metacognitive approach in non-clinical 
courses.200  
Ultimately, this article claims that the question to “how 
should law schools implement the formative assessment man-
date?” is not simply “by providing midterms with more model-
answer feedback.” Rather, it argues that feedback techniques 
must be specifically selected with particular metacognitive 
goals in mind. In addition, it proposes that one of the most val-
uable tools for creating “meaningful feedback” is not in fact a 
 
199. See, e.g., Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 379–85.  
200. See infra Sections III.B.3–III.B.4. It is worth noting that metacognition literature often 
focuses on what students do, rather than on what teachers do. This feels appropriate since the 
metacognitive approach strongly emphasizes active student participation in their own learning 
processes. However, this may also cause the literature to fall short on explaining what teachers 
must do in order to successfully enable metacognitive learning. This may be a reason that met-
acognitive experts often engage in “naming” in practice without highlighting it as a critical part 
of their teaching strategy. 
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feedback technique at all, but the act of “naming,” which helps 
students conceptualize what they are meant to be learning in 
the first place.  
A. The Meaning of “Meaningful Feedback”  
The formative assessment mandate has spurred an energetic 
and thoughtful discussion on how to best implement it, espe-
cially in the context of midterm essay exams with model an-
swers. This is presumed to be the technique of choice for many 
faculty, yet it is also known to be largely ineffective, since stu-
dents often have difficulty properly assessing whether and how 
their own work is different from model. Why do model answers 
so often fail to help students? Studies show that while model 
answers are appropriate for testing information recall, identify-
ing concepts, and very simple problem-solving,201 they are of 
limited value where students must learn higher-order thinking 
skills.202 The reason is that models merely demonstrate what 
successful performance generally looks like, but do not convey 
how a student can actually use this information to assess and 
improve their own work; for instance, models do not communi-
cate the complex analytical processes necessary to produce the 
work; do not articulate what specific qualities make the model 
successful or unsuccessful, or why those qualities are im-
portant; and do not explain why other approaches, including 
the approach taken by the student herself, are flawed.203 Thus, a 
student must divine on her own what lessons to draw from the 
model, how those lessons apply to her own work, and how to 
create strategies to correct her flaws.204 In other words, a student 
must already have relatively strong cognitive and metacogni-
tive skills205 to benefit from a model answer. For these reasons, 
 
201. Frost, supra note 114, at 946–47. 
202. Id. at 957; Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 381–82. 
203. Frost, supra note 114, at 958–59; see also Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 381–82 
204. See Frost, supra note 114, at 940. 
205. See id. at 941. 
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model answers only are effective for a relatively small subset of 
students.  
Metacognitive theory clarifies why the usefulness of model 
answers is limited. A midterm with a model answer only sup-
ports two of the twelve metacognitive steps: performance of a 
task (the exam itself, step 7) and the gathering of indicators of 
how well the student performed (the model answer, step 8). But 
when model answers are simply handed out, what is missing 
entirely is support for the crucial next steps of the metacognitive 
process: the student’s identification of the specific characteris-
tics that make the model successful or not (step 9), her evalua-
tion of whether her own performance has those characteristics 
(step 10), her understanding of what thinking or behavior led 
her to perform poorly (step 11), and her identification of strate-
gies to correct herself next time (step 12). These steps 9 through 
12 are the heart of what makes feedback “meaningful,” because 
they are the mental activities that enable a student to move from 
merely receiving information to actually using that feedback to 
change her work-product. In other words, feedback takes on 
meaning only when students actively engage in these addi-
tional mental processes. Yet these mental processes cannot be 
expected to simply happen on their own. They must be encour-
aged through enhanced feedback techniques deliberately de-
signed and chosen to support students throughout these spe-
cific mental steps. 
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that enhanced-feed-
back techniques recommended by experts generally do support 
specific steps in the metacognitive process. For example, one 
recommendation is to augment a model answer with a detailed 
explanation as to how exactly the model answer demonstrates 
competency,206 such as by explaining very explicitly how the 
model successfully explained or applied the law (for example, 
by focusing on its organizational, analytical, and mechanical 
 
206. Frost, supra note 114, at 958. 
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qualities).207 Another is to identify and analyze the most com-
mon student mistakes through in-class discussion. Both of these 
techniques support metacognitive step 9 by helping students 
identify the specific characteristics of a successful and unsuc-
cessful performance. Thus, even those who use model answers, 
instead of using the gold-standard form of highly individual-
ized and personalized feedback, can find excellent techniques, 
recommended in existing literature, that supports specific men-
tal steps within the metacognitive process and thus should in-
crease the success of the model-answer process.208  
However, it is important to acknowledge that both of the 
model-answer techniques just discussed support only one spe-
cific metacognitive step—step 9—and do not help students in 
the next step, which requires them to evaluate whether the char-
acteristics of success and non-success are actually present in 
their own work. This lack of support for step 10 means that stu-
dents who are unable to complete step 10 on their own will be 
unable to complete the rest of the metacognitive process, and 
thus be unable to improve their outcomes. In short, the lack of 
support for a single step in the process may cause the entire pro-
cess to fail. 
Therefore, even where numerous recommended feedback 
techniques are employed—such as a graded midterm (which 
supports step 8) combined with an explanation of the strengths 
of the model answer and common weaknesses in students 
(which support step 9)—many students may still not benefit. 
Thus, the goal should not be to simply to use a miscellaneous 
assortment of feedback techniques; rather, educators must 
choose techniques that specifically support each of the three 
metacognitive steps (steps 8, 9, and 10) necessary for a student 
to improve, that is, the feedback must support step 8 by indicat-
ing to the student what level of success her performance 
 
207. Sargent & Curcio, supra note 9, at 381–82. Other techniques may include restating the 
original course material from which the answer was drawn and offering concrete ideas to stu-
dents on how to improve performance next time. Id. 
208. See, e.g., SHAW & VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 6. 
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achieved, support step 9 by helping her understand what spe-
cific performance characteristics or traits demonstrate success, 
and which do not, and support step 10 by helping her to iden-
tify whether and how those characteristics are present in her 
own work product.  
Feedback that supports these three steps, in turn, enables the 
student to conduct the two final steps of the process: the very 
personalized, internal examination of what caused the student 
to perform as she did, and what interventions are needed to im-
prove her performance next time (steps 11 and 12). These final 
steps require the student to examine what intellectual and be-
havioral choices led her to produce imperfect work, and re-
quires her to change those things about herself so that she can 
avoid those pitfalls in the future. The student herself is primar-
ily responsible for this work, since only she is in the position to 
both understand and alter her own thoughts and actions. It is 
critical, however, for faculty to encourage students to complete 
these steps of the metacognitive process and to find ways to 
support them in this mental work. For example, reflective ques-
tions may help focus student attention on these final steps, as 
might a discussion of possible ways to correct common analyt-
ical mistakes.  
In sum, since the midterm-with-model-answer approach 
touches upon only two of the metacognitive steps, in order for 
it to succeed with a broad range of students, it must be aug-
mented with carefully selected feedback techniques that sup-
port each of the other steps of the metacognitive process. More-
over, educators must remember that while students necessarily 
must do much of the metacognitive work themselves, faculty 
are responsible for providing enough support and guidance to 
enable the students to do this work.209  
This hypothesis applies not only to midterms with model an-
swers, but also to other kinds of formative assessments. Fortu-
nately, existing literature provides a rich array of both 
 
209. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 239; Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 733–
34; Warren, supra note 115, at 99. 
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formative assessment methods and feedback techniques from 
which to choose. Assessors should therefore choose assessment 
and feedback methods that specifically support student engage-
ment in metacognitive steps 8 to 12, since these steps are what 
put feedback into action and create “meaning” in terms of 
measurable improvement in the students’ competency. If feed-
back methods do not support these crucial steps of the meta-
cognitive process, the formative assessment mandate is very 
likely to fail in its goals.  
B. “Naming” Creates Meaning for Feedback 
The prior discussion is focused on the post-performance (e.g., 
post-exam) provision of feedback. This section offers a second 
new conceptualization of “meaningful feedback,” which is fo-
cused on pre-performance activity, specifically, the pre-perfor-
mance activity of “naming,” or the deconstruction and abstrac-
tion of legal thinking processes. It argues that pre-performance 
“naming” creates context and meaning for post-performance 
feedback, making that feedback inherently more efficient and 
effective.  
The starting premise here is that performance comes at a rel-
atively late stage in the metacognitive process (step 7 of 12 
steps).  It is clear that every metacognitive step builds on each 
of the prior steps, that is, the success of any step depends on 
whether the preceding steps were taken in the right direction. 
It follows that to strengthen self-evaluation and self-improve-
ment skills—the last steps in the metacognitive process—edu-
cators must improve not just the quality of feedback itself, but 
must also strengthen the foundation laid in earlier steps of the 
metacognitive process. Viewed from this perspective, the cen-
tral question shifts from “how do educators provide more 
meaningful feedback, post-performance?” to “what must edu-
cators do pre-performance in order to equip students to produc-
tively use that feedback?”  
The metacognitive process itself sheds light on the answer. 
The very first step in the metacognitive process requires the 
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student to define the learning goal.210 It is apparent that if the 
learning goal is poorly understood at the outset, all of the fol-
lowing steps in the metacognitive process will likewise be mis-
guided: the student will choose inappropriate resources and 
strategies for achieving that goal (steps 2-6), perform poorly 
since she does not know what she is meant to be doing (step 7), 
misidentify the characteristics that demonstrate that the learn-
ing goal has been met (step 9), and so forth.211 In short, it is em-
inently understandable why a student who does not clearly un-
derstand the learning goals in the first place would find it very 
difficult to effectively use a model-answer or otherwise engage 
in productive metacognitive learning. 
Accordingly, focusing solely on improving the quality of 
post-performance feedback takes a too-narrow view of both the 
problem and the solution. While better feedback is important 
and necessary, feedback itself can be made much more effective 
through the clearer definition of learning goals up front, so that 
students have a more accurate understanding from the begin-
ning of what they should aim to accomplish and of what the 
feedback will ultimately be focused on.212  
 
210. See supra Section I.A.  
211. See Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 108 (“The most important part of helping students de-
velop metacognitive skills in the classroom is for the professor to set clear goals for the class.”). 
212. See infra Section III.B.4. The importance of articulating clear metacognitive goals is ech-
oed by the extensive literature on articulating clear learning outcomes, although metacognitive 
learning goals may not be precisely the same as the official learning outcomes. Learning out-
comes can be developed at an institutional level for the curriculum as a whole, for a specific 
course, and for individual assessments (such as a midterm exam); performance standards are 
commonly used to measure whether learning outcomes are achieved. See, e.g., SHAW & 
VANZANDT, supra note 100, at 18, 27, 36, 76–77; Janet W. Fisher, Putting Students at the Center of 
Legal Education: How an Emphasis on Outcome Measures in the ABA Standards for Approval of Law 
Schools Might Transform the Educational Experience of Law Students, 35 S. ILL. U.L.J. 225, 235–37, 
242 (2011); Lori A. Roberts, Assessing Ourselves: Confirming Assumptions and Improving Student 
Learning by Efficiently and Fearlessly Assessing Student Learning Outcomes, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 457, 
474–75 (2011); Marie Summerlin Hamm et al., The Rubric Meets the Road in Law Schools: Program 
Assessment of Student Learning Outcomes as a Fundamental Way for Law Schools to Improve and Ful-
fill Their Respective Missions, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 343, 375 (2018). Metacognitive learning 
goals may or may not be the same as the course’s learning outcomes or performance standards. 
They should, however, refer to specific cognitive process that the students are meant to master. 
See infra Section III. B (discussing the importance of deconstructing lawyerly thinking processes 
into subcomponent parts). Moreover, while learning outcomes may focus on static knowledge 
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If proper goal definition is critical to accurate self-evaluation 
and to the overall success of the metacognitive approach, what 
does goal definition look like in the context of law teaching? A 
specific technique for achieving such clarity in defining learn-
ing goals is referred to here as “naming.” Naming requires fac-
ulty to deconstruct lawyerly thinking processes into their com-
ponent subparts, and to abstract those subparts and assign 
them names or labels. “Naming” is used by clinicians, transfer 
theorists, and by nonclinical metacognition experts, as dis-
cussed in detail below. That naming is used in many different 
realms of the metacognitive revolution supports the hypothesis 
that it is important to the process, can be useful in defining the 
meaning of “meaningful feedback,” and should be given a new 
place of primacy within nonclinical metacognitive theory. 
1. Deconstruction, abstraction, and “naming” in clinical theory and 
practice 
The importance of deconstructing, abstracting, and “naming” 
the subcomponent parts of legal thinking is most clearly set 
forth in writings by clinical theorists. A primary goal of clinical 
educators, for example, is to “map out the lawyering process 
into its component parts and then to propose ideas and theories 
about what constitutes high-quality performance of each 
one.”213 Deconstruction and analysis of the components of law-
yerly thinking is viewed as one of the three principle tenets of 
 
or work product, metacognitive goals should focus on underlying thinking processes rather than 
on the end-products of that thinking. For example, a learning outcome focused on an end-prod-
uct might be to “articulate the elements of burglary” or “produce a research memorandum,” 
while the associated metacognitive goal focused on the underlying thinking process would be 
to “apply specific cognitive techniques for recalling the elements of a legal test” or “prioritize 
initial legal research by relevancy and significance.” See, e.g., Niedwiecki I, supra note 1, at 152 
(noting metacognition focuses on processes, not product). Once the metacognitive learning 
goals are adequately defined by faculty, students can then design appropriate personal sub-
goals, which should be “concrete, short-term, challenging, and realistic,” such as, ‘By the end 
of the 1st day of class I will be able to classify a task with X percent of accuracy.” See SCHWARTZ 
III, supra note 61, at 44. 
213. Robert D. Dinerstein & Elliott S. Milstein, Learning to Be a Lawyer: Embracing Uncertainty, 
Indeterminacy, and the Clinical Curriculum, in TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CLINICAL PEDAGOGY 327, 341 (Susan Bryant et al., eds., 2014). 
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clinical pedagogy,214 with the underlying idea being to take a 
broad lawyering concept, such as “client-centered service” or 
“effective advocacy,” and deconstruct it into its component sub-
parts, allowing each part to be meaningfully examined, studied, 
practiced, and improved.215 
 As thinking processes are deconstructed, the newly-identi-
fied ideas and concepts are given a label or name,216  
so that they are clearly identified for later use. 
Naming involves giving students frameworks 
. . . . [A] failure to “name” may result in the stu-
dent knowing how to do a specific task but not 
how to translate the lesson to other similar tasks. 
Naming also serves to create a shared vocabulary 
for the teachers and students to use during the 
clinic and for the student to use as he or she de-
velops into a professional.217 
According to Professor Carolyn Grose, naming is “at the 
heart” of clinical methodology in part because it helps lawyers 
“understand what we do and why we do it. We give names to 
things in order to make them exist and capable of analysis.”218 
The act of naming thus involves abstracting or generalizing a 
concept, creating a shared understanding and vocabulary, so 
that the concept can be discussed and analyzed. A concept that 
arises within one specific factual context is transferred into a 
generalized or abstracted concept, with a unique name, so that 
 
214. Id. at 496–97. Ever since the early days of clinical scholarship, clinicians have engaged 
in identifying, or naming, what, exactly, a lawyer does. 
215. See id. at 497. 
216. See id. at 500–01. 
217. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Where to Begin? Training New Teachers in the Art of Clinical Pedagogy, 
18 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 521 (2012) (footnote omitted). Naming is so fundamental to clinical 
theory and practice that scholars have suggested that when designing a teaching intervention, 
clinical teachers themselves begin by naming the situation that inspired the teaching oppor-
tunity. See Colleen F. Shanahan & Emily A. Benfer, Adaptive Clinical Teaching, 19 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 517, 527 (2013). For a similar use of metacognition by non-experiential faculty, see Filippa 
Marullo Anzalone, It All Begins with You: Improving Law School Learning Through Professional Self-
Awareness and Critical Reflection, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 324 (2001). 
218. Grose, supra note 28, at 501. 
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it that can be referred to, analyzed, applied, and modified in 
other contexts. 219 Clinicians use naming to identify learning 
goals for students, since only after goals are named can students 
knowingly grapple with them and work productively towards 
achieving them. 
2. Deconstruction and abstraction in learning theory 
The idea that learning is facilitated by deconstruction, or the 
breaking down of complex processes into smaller, more dis-
crete steps, is also supported by learning theory. Professor Bar-
bara Lentz likens the process of learning how to engage in legal 
thinking to the process of learning how to perform a basketball 
free throw, and explains how a basketball novice must at first 
focus her attention separately on each discrete sub-step in the 
overall process of performing a free throw, and that only after 
repeated practice and reflection on the individual sub steps can 
she then begin to combine those sub-steps into a more cohesive, 
seamless performance.220 This need to deconstruct expert 
knowledge into component subparts to make it graspable by a 
novice strongly correlates to the mapping of lawyering pro-
cesses done by clinical faculty with their students. 
The deconstruction of lawyerly thought processes into com-
ponent subparts is also consistent with recommendations from 
the field of instructional design, the profession devoted to the 
creation of effective teaching methodologies.221 As Professor 
Schwartz states, “[i]nstructional designers perform an 
 
219. Deconstruction, abstraction, and naming are also critical to a broader goal of clinical 
teaching, which is to present theoretical frameworks for lawyering and for the lawyer’s role and 
responsibilities within society. See id., at 500–01. Focusing on articulating different theories of 
lawyering “brings into consciousness the often inchoate, pre-conscious theories and principles 
by which the student is operating. Only by bringing into consciousness and making explicit 
those theories that underlie action can the student observe, evaluate, and improve them.” Phyl-
lis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. 
REV. 1599, 1650 (1991). 
220. See Lentz, supra note 8. 
221. See, e.g., Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 383–84 (“Instructional design is a reflective, sys-
tematic, and comprehensive approach to creating instruction.”); Instructional Design Definitions, 
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN CENTRAL, https://www.instructionaldesigncentral.com/whatisinstruc-
tionaldesign (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
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information-processing analysis of a goal to ‘decompose’ the 
goal into the mental steps a person must go through to perform 
it,” thus “seek[ing] to identify and sequence all the mental steps 
involved in achieving the learning goal.”222 
Transfer theory further supports the abstraction or generali-
zation of mental processes as key to learning how to transfer 
knowledge from one situation to another. Generalization ena-
bles students to recognize and apply a concept even when it 
arises in a different, unfamiliar context. Professor Kowalski em-
phasizes 
the importance of the need to generalize learn-
ing in order to apply it in new contexts. Charles 
Judd pointed out that transfer occurs “by way of 
understanding the abstract general principle un-
derlying a phenomenon which can then be ap-
plied to situations that do not possess obvious 
identical elements.” . . . [Generalization means 
that] ‘understanding is transposable to a wider 
range of situations’ . . . [and] identifies meaning as 
an important cohesive force, whose presence is 
necessary to the comprehension and adaptability 
of general principles.223 
Thus, both deconstruction and abstraction are emphasized by 
general learning theory, instructional designers, and transfer 
theory in ways that strongly echo the clinical technique of nam-
ing. 
3. Deconstruction, abstraction, and “naming” in nonclinical 
metacognitive theory and practice 
Like clinical theory and transfer theory, nonclinical metacog-
nitive theory and practice also demonstrate the importance of 
faculty clearly articulating for students the legal thinking and 
reasoning process that they want students to learn. Nonclinical 
 
222. Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 398. 
223. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 70. 
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writings do not use the term “naming,” although nonclinical 
metacognition experts are clearly engaged in naming in their 
classrooms in much the same way that clinical experts are. This 
section first discusses nonclinical theory, which clearly sup-
ports the concept of “naming” even though it does not use that 
term. It then turns to nonclinical practice, which is relatively ad-
vanced in terms of naming.  
The concept in nonclinical literature that is most closely re-
lated to deconstruction is “modeling,” which is sometimes also 
referred to as engaging in cognitive “thinking aloud.”224 Model-
ing is when an expert describes to students her “inner mono-
logue,” demonstrating her intellectual process step-by-step “by 
stating out loud every thought with respect to the problem be-
ing solved, seeking to provide students with a rough infor-
mation-processing demonstration.”225 “The ultimate goal is to 
slow down what normally is instantaneous analysis for the ex-
pert metacognitive thinker” by “freezing the frames at critical 
steps along the chain of reasoning.”226 Demonstrating in detail 
how the expert’s thought process progresses is meant to assist 
the student in understanding the discrete sub-steps that lead 
the thinker to her final conclusion, and to enable the student to 
engage in those sub-steps herself.227 
Modeling thus incorporates the concept of deconstruction.228 
Some explicit references to deconstruction also exist in the non-
clinical literature, although these are merely references made in 
passing.229 The concept of modeling itself is not fully developed 
 
224. See Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 415. 
225. Id. at 415–16; Schwartz I, supra note 1, at 491, 503–04; see also Alleva & Gundlach, supra 
note 48, at 729–31; Kowalski, supra note 35, at 98–99. 
226. Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 731–32. 
227. For an example of modeling, see id. at 730–31 (providing an example designed to coun-
ter the common misunderstanding that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are “black-letter 
law” that can only be interpreted in one way). 
228. Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 398. 
229. See, e.g., Fruehwald, supra note 8, at 110 (“Part of being explicit in teaching [metacogni-
tion] is breaking down complex tasks into component skills (unpacking). While experts can 
often see how the parts fit together, novices often need help with unpacking.”); Bloom II, supra 
note 33, at 332 (“I attempt to break down the overall goals of improved academic performance 
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or explored, however, except in the work of Professor Michael 
Hunter Schwartz,230 and it is not often prioritized as a compo-
nent of nonclinical metacognitive theory in law teaching. 231 This 
might suggest that modeling, and the associated concepts of de-
construction, abstraction, and naming of legal thinking pro-
cesses, are unimportant to nonclinical metacognition experts. 
However, what these experts actually do in the classroom sug-
gests the opposite. The literature reveals that nonclinical meta-
cognitivists are, in fact, already intensely engaged in the project 
of deconstructing, abstracting, and naming the many different 
intellectual processes involved in “thinking like a lawyer.”  
 
into small manageable steps. I find this strategy not only helps my students regulate their be-
havior but also facilitates their self-regulation of motivation.”). 
230. Experts acknowledge that proper modeling is extremely difficult to perform because 
faculty are very likely to perform certain mental processes without conscious effort, and there-
fore casual attempts at modeling are highly likely to omit crucial steps. Fruehwald, supra, note 
8, at 109. Professor Schwartz appears to be the only legal scholar deeply engaged in exploring 
the problems of modeling and possible solutions. He suggests that one possible way to prevent 
incomplete modeling is to have a second expert actively question the faculty member as she 
models, so that she is encouraged to explain fully her thought process. Schwartz I, supra note 1, 
at 490. Another strategy he suggests is to undertake a comprehensive process of interviewing 
multiple experts, posing various hypotheticals, and mapping out expert responses with detail 
and care, in order to create a complete model. Schwartz II, supra note 23, at 398. Unfortunately, 
Professor Schwartz found no documentation that educators have engaged in these best prac-
tices, nor that any legal scholar had attempted to deconstruct the intellectual sub-steps required 
to analyze a problem within their specific doctrinal subject matter. Id. at 398. Schwartz himself 
appears to be the exception, as he provides an example of deconstruction of the contract law 
principle of illusory promise. Id. at 399–401; see infra Section III.B.4 (explaining that the practice 
of metacognition is much more well-developed than the theory with respect to deconstruction). 
231. Why are deconstruction and abstraction largely absent in this body of work? It may be 
because while legal scholars have long attempted to articulate the thinking processes involved 
in legal analysis, see, e.g., Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in 
American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (1996); Sanford Levinson, Taking Law Seri-
ously: Reflections on “Thinking Like A Lawyer,” 30 STAN. L. REV. 1071, 1072–74 (1978), many have 
pointed out the difficulty, and perhaps impossibility, of defining what it means “to think like a 
lawyer.” See, e.g., Preston et al., supra note 1, at 1054 (“For decades, scholars have groaned under 
the weight of trying to describe what ‘thinking like a lawyer’ means.”); Edwards, supra note 12, 
at 218 (“Teaching students to ‘think like lawyers’ is too vague to pass muster as an appropriate 
mission. Most law schools have not examined what lawyers do, much less what they think, how 
they think, and whether legal thinking is any different than critical thinking in any other disci-
pline.” (quoting GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 49 (2000))); 
Kurt M. Saunders & Linda Levine, Learning to Think Like A Lawyer, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 121, 121–22 
(1994) (“There has been much debate as to exactly what thinking like a lawyer involves and 
how to best teach this process. . . . As yet, legal educators have not decided if and how thinking 
like a lawyer differs from thinking like an engineer, a physician, or a writer.”).  
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One example is Professor Schwartz’s text for incoming first-
year students, which breaks down many foundational legal 
thinking skills into discrete sub-steps—identifying, for exam-
ple, a precise four-step procedure for “applying rules to facts,” 
and further identifying relevant subskills, such as the “ability to 
draw inferences from facts.”232 Other metacognition experts 
suggest that fundamental legal skills may include how to use 
authoritative interpretations of a rule to assess the validity of 
one’s legal hypothesis,233 how to assess whether a given fact is 
relevant,234 and how and when to use inductive, deductive, or 
other forms of reasoning.235 Professor Bloom refers to identify-
ing the use of “different tools for analysis (such as rule-based, 
analogy-based, and policy-based),” because “[o]nce [students] 
are able to identify and articulate the specific components of 
successful writing, they are able to take the next step of using 
these tools in their own analysis.”236 Another technique used by 
Professor Bloom is to ask students to engage in a “cognitive 
think-aloud,” which enables Professor Bloom to identify and 
deconstruct the student’s thinking patterns, and further helps 
her to teach the student how to do that deconstruction work 
herself.237  
A particularly comprehensive effort at deconstruction and 
abstraction is offered by Professor Kowalski, who offers a cur-
riculum-wide map of skills commonly used in legal thinking, 
and maps how these processes may appear in different contexts 
within legal education and legal practice.238 Specifically, Profes-
sor Kowalski names four categories of “core lawyering skills in 
 
232. SCHWARTZ III, supra note 61, at 211, 215–20. 
233. See Alleva & Gundlach, supra note 48, at 730. 
234. See Niedwiecki II, supra note 11, at 59–60. 
235. Id. at 58. 
236. Bloom II, supra note 33, at 341. 
237. Id. at 342. Professor Jennifer Cooper illustrates another example of “naming” cognitive 
techniques with her reference to different methods of reading, such as skimming, scanning, 
questioning, rephrasing, and connecting “new information to prior knowledge.” Jennifer M. 
Cooper, Smarter Law Learning: Using Cognitive Science to Maximize Law Learning, 44 CAP. U.L. 
REV. 551, 583 (2016). 
238. Kowalski, supra note 35, at 55–56.  
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their fixed, abstract forms”: formal legal analysis, advocacy, 
critical thinking, and professionalism,239 which categories in 
turn encompass many more specific skills, such as “[a]ddress-
ing counter arguments,” “[a]rguing in the alternative,” 
“[a]sserting narrative and other human and emotional ele-
ments,” “[q]uestioning the motives and policies behind laws 
and decisions,” and so on.240 
These examples both demonstrate that metacognition schol-
ars deeply value deconstruction and abstraction, and illustrate 
the impressive and serious work that they are doing in naming 
the key components of the lawyerly thinking process. Unfortu-
nately, this important work is largely overlooked in the schol-
arly literature.  While educator-scholars are already engaged in 
this work of their own accord, it is not afforded a place of pri-
macy in discussions of nonclinical metacognitive theory, and its 
centrality to success of the metacognitive process is frequently 
overlooked.   
Appropriate recognition of this work, however, is critically 
important. Just as naming enables clinical students to engage in 
metacognitive learning, the deconstruction and abstraction of 
lawyering thinking processes in nonclinical education enables 
students to metacognitively grapple with those thinking pro-
cesses. This in turn is crucial to the success of the mandate to 
implement formative assessment with meaningful feedback. In 
short, the naming of learning goals at the outset enables stu-
dents to understand what they are striving towards, and to un-
derstand what feedback is meant to help them accomplish.  
Naming is thus a fundamental precursor to meaningful feed-
back, and thus is fundamental to the project of formative assess-
ment itself.  
 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 96. 
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CONCLUSION 
Metacognitive thinking is today integrated into the legal cur-
riculum more broadly and deeply than previously recognized. 
Further expansion of metacognitive principles into the curricu-
lum is inevitable, given the accreditation mandate to implement 
formative assessment with meaningful feedback across the cur-
riculum. While this creates opportunities for great benefit, if the 
metacognitive approach is not properly implemented it also 
poses a real threat of harm to institutions, students, and the pro-
fession. This Article has sought to define ways to prevent this 
harm, and to maximize the benefits of metacognition, by first 
recognizing the many different components of the metacogni-
tive revolution as intrinsically related to each other, and then by 
examining them to point to what must be done to effectively 
implement the meaningful-feedback mandate. It posits that 
feedback techniques must be chosen with the deliberate goal of 
helping students complete the final steps of the metacognitive 
cycle. It further argues that nonclinical metacognitive theory 
should newly emphasize the naming of legal thinking processes 
as fundamental to the theory’s practical success. Doing so will 
bring to the forefront the impressive work already being done 
with respect to naming, which in turn will greatly increase the 
effectiveness of the formative assessment mandate.  
As law schools design their futures, institutions must now 
recognize and embrace the metacognitive revolution and its 
promise, along with its challenges. Drawing on the experiences 
and expertise that exists across all components of the revolution 
reveals common principles and methodologies and suggests 
how its theoretical framework must be revised in order to max-
imize its benefits. 
